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While recent research has devoted much attention to the effect of local sociopolitical 
contexts on organizations, how society-wide institutional pressures—such as federal 
policies—affect the relationship between the two has rarely been discussed by 
organizational scholars. This is an important question because local and society-wide 
institutional environments concurrently shape organizational behavior. Building on the 
theory of political mediation and an institutional perspective, we argue that state-level 
sociopolitical influences on organizations will depend on the broader regulatory 
context at the federal level. We use data on coal-fired facilities’ sulfur dioxide (SO2) 
emissions to address the question of when formal and informal local (state-level) 
sociopolitical contexts directly influence organizations’ environmental performance. 
Our results show that when the national-level Acid Rain Program (ARP) was regarded 
as an effective regulation for controlling SO2 emissions (2003–2009), coal-fired 
facilities, as well as local government officials, key stakeholders, and social movement 
organizations (SMOs), attended to the implementation of the federal law. As a 
consequence, local sociopolitical contexts had a negligible effect on SO2 emissions by 
individual facilities. However, when stakeholders questioned the effectiveness of the 
ARP (2010–2011), the direct impact of SMOs and other sociopolitical contexts at the 
state level on facilities’ emissions increased. From an institutional perspective, our 
results imply that local sociopolitical contexts are themselves embedded within the 
larger, society-wide, institutional environment, and that evaluating the direct influence 
of local sociopolitical pressures on organizations thus requires a more dynamic 
approach that includes consideration of institutional contexts at different levels in 
society. 
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CHAPTER 1.  
INTRODUCTION 
Exploring the Influence of the Sociopolitical Contexts on Organizations 
 
Recent management studies increasingly highlight the importance of theorizing how 
sociopolitical and cultural contexts at different levels concurrently shape organizational 
behaviors and outcomes (Marquis and Battilana, 2009; Marquis, Lounsbury, and Greenwood, 
2011). Scholars in this field argue that organizational activities are often constrained or enabled 
by formal (regulatory) and informal (normative and cultural-cognitive) institutional 
infrastructures at the local and national levels. In this vein, while many empirical studies find 
evidence for the enduring influence of local institutional environments on organizations’ 
decision-making processes and performance, the role of local institutional contexts has been 
described as a source of resistance to or compliance with pressures at different levels (Marquis 
and Lounsbury, 2007; Greenwood et al., 2011).  
While recent research has devoted much attention to the effect of local sociopolitical 
contexts on organizations, how society-wide institutional pressures—such as federal policies—
affect the relationship between the two has been somewhat oversimplified by organizational 
scholars. For example, scholars have found that organizations located in regions with progressive 
sociopolitical norms and values tend to engage more in prosocial or pro-environmental activities 
accepted at the federal level (Lee and Lounsbury, 2015; Marquis et al., 2016; Luo et al., 2017). 
Others have found that regional values affect firms’ business strategies and entrepreneurial 
activities to meet local and federal normative demands (Eesley et al., 2016; Lounsbury, 2007; 
Marquis and Lounsbury, 2007). That is, prior studies imply that organizations are likely to 
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conform more closely to formalized rules and standards at the federal level when these standards 
are aligned with local institutional contexts.  
This is an important criticism because local and society-wide institutional environments 
concurrently shape organizational behavior. In this vein, Zucker’s (1986) work on institutional-
based trust provides insights on how the relationship between institutional elements at different 
levels might be interactive, not additive. In other words, the relationship between local and 
society-wide institutional environments is not a simple dichotomy between whether they 
reinforce each other or not. According to Zucker, members of a society have different 
expectations and understandings of regulatory processes, depending on their shared norms and 
values. Rules and regulations define the validity of a specific action, while norms and values 
serve as a general framework for behavior shared by the members of a society. She argues that 
during the formalization process (e.g., during the process of enacting a regulation), diverse 
cultural and normative elements are “forced into a uniform pattern” (Zucker, 1986: 99). As a 
result, as the various stakeholders develop trust in formalized rules, they begin to rely more on 
institutionalized rules and regulations rather than on shared norms or traditional values. Zucker’s 
results show that different institutional elements could substitute for each other, as an increase in 
one type of force may reduce the need for the other (Durkheim and Halls, 1984; Garfinkel, 
1963). 
Building on this perspective, in this dissertation I argue that state-level sociopolitical 
influences on organizations will depend on the broader regulatory context at the federal level. I 
use data on coal-fired facilities’ sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions to address the question of when 
formal and informal local (state-level) sociopolitical contexts directly influence organizations’ 
environmental performance. My results show that when the national-level Acid Rain Program 
 3 
 
(ARP) was regarded as an effective regulation for controlling SO2 emissions (2003–2009), coal-
fired facilities, as well as local government officials, key stakeholders, and social movement 
organizations (SMOs), attended to the implementation of the federal law. As a consequence, 
local sociopolitical contexts had a negligible effect on SO2 emissions by individual facilities. 
However, when stakeholders questioned the effectiveness of the ARP (2010–2011), the direct 
impact of SMOs and other sociopolitical contexts at the state level on facilities’ emissions 
increased. From an institutional perspective, my results imply that local sociopolitical contexts 
are themselves embedded within the larger, society-wide institutional environment, and that 
evaluating the direct influence of local sociopolitical pressures on organizations thus requires a 
more dynamic approach that includes consideration of institutional contexts at different levels in 
society. 
 
    1.1 Local (State-level) Sociopolitical Contexts as an Institutional Order 
Neo-institutional theory has provided valuable insights into how organizations operating in a 
given institutional environment and facing sociopolitical and cultural pressures come to resemble 
one another by adopting the same legitimated formal structure (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; 
DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Boiral, 2003). In this vein, some early scholars argued that 
organizational forms would become homogeneous regardless of geographic boundaries because 
of the development of modern technologies and globalization trends that increased inter-
organizational influences (Meyer, Ramirez, and Soysal, 1992; Marquis and Battilana, 2009). 
However, recent studies continue to show that local institutional contexts have an enduring 
influence on organizational activities (Sine et al., 2005; Freeman and Audia, 2006; Marquis and 
Battilana, 2009; Hiatt et al., 2009; Greenwood et al., 2011; Marquis, Lounsbury, and 
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Greenwood, 2011; Lee and Lounsbury, 2015). According to these studies, organizational 
activities are often constrained by formal (regulatory) and informal (normative and cultural-
cognitive) institutional environments at the local level.  
Organizations conform to local regulatory pressure because government entities have the 
power to sanction them for noncompliance through laws and court rulings (Scott, 1995). For 
example, Guthrie and Roth (1999a, 1999b) found that firms operating in a region where the local 
judiciary supported the federal equal employment law had more female CEOs. They argue that 
these organizations faced stronger pressures to promote women to higher managerial positions 
because of local enforcement. Thus, local government actors can either strengthen or weaken the 
compliance of locally based organizations with national policies by shaping local actors’ social 
and material interests. 
In addition to the local regulatory environment, informal institutional elements at the 
state level such as shared norms and values also constrain or enable locally based organizations 
by setting the standard that is commonly accepted in the region (Marquis et al., 2007). These 
standards are created by local stakeholders and guide community members as to “what is right to 
do around here.” Previous studies on the role of local communities have documented how 
normative pressures vary by region (Marquis, 2003; Lounsbury, 2007; Marquis et al., 2013). For 
instance, a few scholars have illustrated how local relational networks and foundations function 
as communications channels among their members, who develop a common understanding of 
how legitimate organizations should operate (Galaskiewicz 1991; Campbell, 2007; Marquis et 
al., 2007; Marquis et al., 2013). These networks and local institutions, such as upper-class social 
clubs, NGOs, local community foundations, and professional and industry associations, provide 
a normative basis for adopting particular organizational practices, structures, and forms based on 
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their expertise and credibility (Galaskiewicz 1991; Campbell, 2007; Marquis and Lounsbury, 
2007; Marquis et al., 2013). 
While these studies show the enduring influence of local normative actors on 
organizations, we still lack a full understanding of how the sociopolitical environment at the 
societal (i.e., at the upper) level interacts with local pressures to concurrently shape 
organizational outcomes. Studies examining the role of regional sociopolitical contexts have 
observed firm behaviors, such as conserving the environment or engaging in corporate social 
responsibility and philanthropic activities, which do not have sufficient stakeholder acceptance 
or consensus at the federal level (Marquis et al., 2007; Marquis et al., 2011). Similarly, others 
have examined how organizations react to federal regulations or norms that require voluntary 
compliance (Lee and Lounsbury, 2015). For example, Lee and Lounsbury (2015) investigated 
how organizations responded to the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI), a reporting standard 
monitored by the EPA, which mandated that companies collect and report data on the release of 
certain toxic chemicals. Given the lack of consensus at the federal level with respect to the 
coercive mechanism, these studies were adequate for observing local influences on the level of 
compliance but not for examining how both levels of sociopolitical contexts concurrently shape 
organizational behavior. 
Despite their valuable insights, prior studies overlooked the possibility that the local 
institutional environment both affects and is affected by federal regulatory standards. Without 
addressing this gap, scholars may implicitly assume that the association between local 
institutional context and federal policy is additive rather than interactive, as empirical studies 
increasingly show how the local institutional context acts as a source of resistance to or 
compliance with a policy or a practice at the federal level. Considering both contexts 
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simultaneously in organizational research leads us to a simple research question: Is the 
relationship between federal and local institutional pressures a simple dichotomy of 
reinforcement versus contradiction, as implicitly assumed in the existing literature? Or is the 
relationship more interactive and dynamic? For example, organizations might pay more attention 
to one context than the other (local vs. federal). The purpose of this dissertation is to delve 
deeper into this question.  
 
    1.2 Research Context: The Acid Rain Program  
To solve my theoretical question, in chapter two I present the research setting of this dissertation 
– the Acid Rain Program (ARP). The ARP was the first market-based policy adopted in the 
United States, which was initiated under Title IV of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments. 
During this period, previous command-and-control policies were criticized for two reasons: first, 
mainstream economists argued that monitoring activities such as pollution increase or nature 
destruction by a centralized governmental institution is not cost-effective. Furthermore, policy 
makers in favor of free-market principles believed that imposing identical standards on targeted 
actors would fail to incentivize these actors to comply beyond what is required by the regulation 
(Coase, 1960). 
In keeping with neoliberal economic policies incorporating market mechanisms, the ARP 
was enacted with the goal of reducing acidic compounds created from burning fossil fuels by 45 
percent compared with 1980 levels under the monitoring of the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA). This program involved setting a permanent cap on the total amounts of pollutants 
(mainly sulfur dioxide - SO2) and allowed market participants to trade pollutant allowances. 
Each coal-fired utility was assigned a pollution allowance based on past performance; if their 
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pollution level was below the allowance, they could sell their surplus allowance to firms that 
exceeded their allowance. This program was thus intended to create monetary incentives to 
reduce pollution (e.g., by installing filters or using low-sulfur coal) (Goulder, 2013; Sovacool, 
2011). 
In the second chapter, I view the ARP through a sociological lens. From the 1970s, free 
market ideology was viewed as an icon of modern capitalism and a solution to social problems 
(Backhouse, 2005). This led many U.S. policy-makers and members of the public to accept the 
idea of using market-based solutions to fix environmental problems. The ARP earned near-
unanimous support in the Senate and House of Representatives, authorizing the EPA to monitor 
and promote the trading market (Ellerman et al., 2000). Social movement organizations which 
initially opposed the market-based policy (e.g. the Sierra Club) eventually participated actively 
in the market and used it as a strategy to accomplish further reduction of emissions (Chan et al., 
2012; Ellerman et al., 2000). When the program was initiated, these proxies provided confidence 
among facilities and attracted other actors outside the regulated field to participate in the market, 
raising the price of an allowance. As a result, the reduction in emissions was mostly achieved 
through market mechanisms supported by the Acid Rain Program (Ellerman & Montero, 2007; 
Chan et al., 2012; Schmalensee and Stavins, 2013). 
However, when a series of court rulings substantially vacated a major trading rule of the 
ARP (after 2010), the confidence in the ability of market mechanisms to pressure facilities to 
reduce pollution was also vacated; hence, the operational stability and monetary incentives 
gained from allowances no longer existed. Interestingly, the levels of emissions continued to 
drop even after the legitimacy of the allowance market was legally challenged. That is, the policy 
continued to have an effect even after it was vacated by court rulings, which led prices of 
 8 
 
allowances to drop to nearly zero. Some argued that the effectiveness of the program was an 
outcome of the “cap” rather than the “trade” because the program’s long-term goal of reducing 
total amounts of annual emissions was accomplished by 2007 (Chan et al., 2012; Evans & 
Woodward, 2013; Schmalensee & Stavins, 2013). This phenomenon is puzzling since, from an 
economic standpoint, the drop-in allowance price could have incentivized fossil-fuel power 
plants to increase SO2 emissions as the marginal cost of reducing emissions decreased. This led 
many scholars to suggest various potential factors that may have led to the continued impact of 
the earlier policy. In addition to various economic and technological factors, I attempt to explain 
how formal and informal sociopolitical influences at the state level contributed to the additional 
drop in emissions when the validity of the federal law was questioned.     
 
    1.3 Empirical Chapter: When Do Local Sociopolitical Contexts Matter?  
Although many recent studies have acknowledged the impact of regional institutional 
pressures on organizational outcomes, our understanding of how the interaction between global 
(upper-level) and local pressures shapes organizational decisions is limited. In this chapter, I 
examine how the strength of local normative pressure on organizations changes depending on the 
perceived effectiveness of the regulation at the upper-level (global or federal). Using the context 
of the Acid Rain Program (ARP), the first market-based environmental policy in the U.S., I show 
that local normative pressures created by local social movement organizations and citizens’ 
political ideology had a greater impact on coal-fired facilities’ emissions of pollution when the 
validity of the federal regulation was disputed by stakeholders (2010-2011). That is, when the 
federal law did not serve as an overarching regulatory framework, local normative influences 
replaced the role of the federal regulation.   
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Here, I present two mechanisms that induced coal-fired facilities to pay closer attention to 
local sociopolitical contexts when federal regulations were contested. First, I suggest that the 
lack of validity associated with the federal law shifted the attention of local governments, SMOs, 
and key stakeholders from the ARP to local pro-environmental initiatives. In this regard, local 
sociopolitical influences on coal-fired facilities increased to maintain the objectives of the 
questionable federal policy. In particular, in this chapter I investigate how the influence of the 
Sierra Club and state-level environmental policies (e.g. Renewable Portfolio Standards) on 
facilities’ SO2 emissions changed before and after the vacating of major trading rules under the 
ARP.    
Furthermore, I argue that coal-fired facilities lost their legal protections related to SO2 
emissions at the federal level when the ARP was being challenged. While the purpose of federal 
regulation is to control target organizations’ activities, compliance also provides a signal of 
“good faith” efforts to address problems (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Tolbert and Zucker, 1996). 
That is, in theory coal-fired facilities could maintain their operational stability to some extent by 
securing their rights to pollute regardless of pro-environmental pressures at the state level. As a 
result, I contend that facilities would start to consider local regulative and normative pressures as 
federal regulations could no longer secure their own legitimacy and stable operation.  
To test my hypotheses, I use data from the EPA on emissions from coal-fired power 
plants in the U.S. from 2003 to 2011, and on rates of participation in the purchase and sale of 
pollution allowances. I combine these data with state-level characteristics from multiple sources. 
I divide my data into two different time periods: 2003-2009, when the policy was regarded as an 
effective tool, and 2010-2011, after the government decided to drop major trading rules from the 
ARP. Using a multilevel analysis, I found that the size of environmental movement 
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organizations, the political ideology, and regulatory initiatives in a state are significantly related 
to reduction in SO2 emissions by plants in that state only after the validity of the ARP was 
challenged. My results imply that the relationship between local and federal sociopolitical 
contexts might be substitutive rather than additive.  
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CHAPTER 2.  
RESEARCH CONTEXT: LEARNING FROM THE COLLAPSE OF THE ACID RAIN 
PROGRAM  
Introduction 
In keeping with “free market” ideology, the U.S. Congress passed the Clean Air Act 
Amendments of 1990 establishing the Acid Rain Program (ARP), which was aimed at reducing 
acid rain pollutants using market-based mechanisms at the federal level. This “grand policy 
experiment” (Stavins, 1998; p.103) was designed to reduce the level of sulfur dioxide (SO2) 
emissions by creating a market for pollution permits (also known as allowances). In theory, this 
market would incentivize polluters to decrease the level of emissions. When the new law was 
implemented, the idea of the market as an effective and efficient regulatory mechanism for 
controlling pollution emissions was strongly supported by local governments and non-
governmental organizations, including environmental activists who had initially opposed the 
market-based policy during the early 1980s (Chan et al., 2012; Schmalensee and Stavins, 2013). 
The perceived effectiveness of the policy, however, was first threatened between 2008 
and 2009 when the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia (D.C.) Circuit invalidated 
a new rule (the Clean Air Interstate Rule-CAIR) introduced by the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) in an attempt to strengthen the ARP. The new rule was intended to tighten the 
emission standards for 28 eastern states and the District of Columbia, which EPA considered to 
be heavy polluters. After multiple failed revisions and legal battles, in 2010 the Obama 
administration finally dropped the new rule from the ARP and the price of an allowance became 
significantly lower than that of operating filters (Chan et al., 2012; Evans and Woodward, 2013). 
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For coal-fired facilities, this meant that purchasing and using allowances in order to pollute was 
cheaper than using filters to reduce the emissions of the toxic gas. As a consequence, the EPA 
introduced another revised rule in 2012, but the idea of this market-based solution as an effective 
federal environmental policy continued to be challenged by stakeholders and scholars 
(Schmalensee and Stavins, 2013).   
 In this chapter, I provide a general background on the ARP and summarize the 
sociopolitical context of its formulation, enactment, and implementation at the federal level. In 
particular, I investigate how formal (e.g. government officials, policy makers) and informal (e.g. 
NGOs, social movement organizations) sociopolitical actors responded to a series of events 
associated with the ARP.  
 
2.1 The ARP: A Cap-and-Trade Approach to Pollution Control          
Traditional regulations impose uniform requirements on all of the actors within formal guidelines 
subject to the regulatory programs. For example, countries such as South Korea use centralized 
pollution control laws which impose firms to comply with methods and schedules designated by 
the government. Tripp and Dudek (1989: 369) criticized this command and control system 
because “all sources face a rigid ceiling [, and as a result,] firms have no incentive to reduce 
discharges below the prescribed limits.” Moreover, these scholars argued that the lack of 
incentives would lead firms to overlook innovative approaches for reducing toxic materials more 
than their legal requirements. Others contended that under the traditional system, governments 
would experience high costs for monitoring targeted organizations (Ellerman, 2000).           
Following the trend of liberalization and deregulation in the 1980s, the use of market-
based policies such as cap-and-trade systems, credits, and transferable property rights grew 
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considerably. Here, the idea is that once the means of compliance is capitalized, the price 
mechanism adequately incentivizes market participants to adequately preserve public goods. The 
incentive structure allows profit-driven actors to be innovative by searching for the best methods 
of compliance (Coase, 1960). According to economists, these policies are efficient for the 
government because the role of the state is to simply establish the basis of market transactions 
for public goods by ensuring property rights, voluntary exchange, and common law liability rules 
(Anderson, 2004). As a result, during this period, policymakers who embraced the free market 
beliefs increasingly accepted the idea of market-based policies as a means of regulating logging 
and forestry (Tripp and Dudek, 1989), restoring ecosystems (Hahn and Hester, 1989; Foster and 
Hahn, 1995; Klier et al., 1997), setting quotas on tobacco and dairy products (McCann, 1996), 
and even controlling population growth (Daly, 1996).  
In line with many market-based policies, the ARP uses a “cap and trade” approach. First, 
the government sets a limit, which is the “cap,” on the total amounts of pollutants for a certain 
period. The government then issues “allowances” or “permits” to emitters such as coal-fired 
power plants. Some allowances are distributed to emitters free of charge and some are sold for a 
certain price. The total number of allowances created in each year is always identical to the cap. 
Then, entities subjected to the program must surrender allowances equivalent to their actual 
emissions to the government at the end of the compliance period. If they fail to surrender the 
appropriate amount of allowances, the government imposes legal sanctions or monetary penalties 
on them.   
Polluters, along with other market participants could buy allowances on the market, sell 
or transfer their allowances to other parties, or reserve (bank) them for future use. The “trading” 
component is designed to encourage power plants to respond strategically to the new legal 
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standards, because the increased marginal cost of reducing emissions (i.e., allowance price 
increases) should incentivize emitters to search for alternative ways (e.g. using filters) to 
decrease emissions. In this respect, reducing emissions using a market-based system provides 
regulated sources with the flexibility to select the most cost-effective approach to reduce 
emissions and has proven to be a highly effective way to achieve reduction in emissions, meet 
environmental goals, and improve human health (Evans and Woodward, 2013). 
In short, unlike a traditional command-and-control system that mandates the same means 
of legal compliance across targeted actors, the motivation for a market-based policy is to induce 
regulated actors’ moral behavior by aligning monetary incentives with socially desired outcomes 
such as preserving public goods. In doing so, the ARP involved setting a permanent cap on the 
total amounts of pollutants (mainly sulfur dioxide - SO2) and allowing market participants to 
freely trade their allowances. Market activities associated with the program were intended to 
provide operational flexibility for facilities, which were assumed to be rational entities, to search 
for cost-effective ways to generate energy while reducing acid rain pollutants. Since the price of 
an allowance served as a key criterion for selecting abatement strategies, maintaining market 
confidence was a critical factor for achieving policy objectives (Chan et al., 2012; Ellerman, 
2000; Schmalensee and Stavins, 2013). In the next section, based on the historical context of the 
ARP, I investigate how the value of an allowance was affected by various sociopolitical actors 
associated with the policy. 
 
2.2.1 A Brief History of the ARP and the Clean Air Interstate Rule (1995~2011)   
Since the 1970s, policy makers have increasingly viewed the market as a solution to a variety of 
social problems (Backhouse, 2005), including environmental pollution. In response to the 
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concerns raised over acid rain, the U.S. Congress passed the Clean Air Act Amendments in 
1990. Under Title IV of the Act, power generators using fossil fuels were required to surrender to 
the EPA one allowance for each ton of sulfur dioxide (SO2) emitted. SO2, a gas emitted mainly 
by facilities burning fossil fuels, is known for contributing to the acidification of forests and 
lakes. It is also known to precede the forming of particulates, which are a serious threat to public 
health and the environment. To preserve the environment, the SO2 trading program, which is the 
first market-based environmental policy in the U.S., was implemented under the supervision of 
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The EPA acted as the regulator of this newly 
constructed market, strictly monitoring the emissions rate of each power plant and securing the 
price value of an allowance to establish confidence in the market.  
The objective of the program was to limit annual emissions from fossil-fuel-based power 
plants to 8.95 million tons by 2010, a 50 percent drop from the level of SO2 emitted in 1980, by 
capitalizing the right to emit this pollutant. The program was implemented in two phases so that 
older facilities with a lack of equipment associated with SO2 reduction technology could adjust to 
the new regulatory environment. Phase I began in 1995, affecting the 110 dirtiest SO2-generating 
facilities. The remaining coal-fired power plants came under Phase 2, which began in 2000. 
The EPA set an overall cap on SO2 emissions for each facility based on the historical 
operational records. At the end of the year, facilities were required to surrender one allowance 
for each ton of SO2 produced. If they had unused allowances, these facilities could then either 
bank them for future needs or participate in the trading market. Market participants comprised all 
the buyers and sellers who could potentially influence the price of an allowance: any individual 
persons, state agencies, corporations, brokers, environmental groups, and other NGOs. The 
“trading” component was aimed to encourage power plants to strategically respond to the new 
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legal standards because the increased marginal cost of reducing emissions (i.e. allowance price 
increases) would incentivize dirty power plants to search for alternative ways to decrease 
emissions.  
Although controversial in the beginning, the ARP earned near-unanimous support in the 
Senate and House of Representatives, which authorized the EPA to monitor and promote the 
trading market1 (Ellerman, 2000; Rich, 2016). Most environmental movement organizations 
initially opposed the market-based policy as they viewed allowances as purchasing the right to 
pollute. In order to gain support from activists, the Reagan administration included major 
environmental groups (e.g. the Acid Rain Retirement Fund, the Environmental Defense Fund, 
the Sierra Club, and so forth) in the regulatory process (United Press International - Washington, 
Oct 18. 1983). Eventually by 1990, the program was accepted by the leading environmental 
movement organizations including the Sierra Club, the Izaak Walton League, Friends of the 
Earth, the Environmental Defense Fund and the U.S. Public Interest Research Group (Maclean, 
Chicago Tribune, April 4, 19872). This led other environmental movement organizations to 
support the program and even participate actively in the market, using the purchase of 
allowances as a strategy to accomplish further reductions of emissions (Chan et al., 2012; 
Schmalensee and Stavins, 2013). 
In May 2005, to further tighten the SO2 cap, the George W. Bush administration proposed 
the Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR), a new trading program built on the ARP, with the purpose 
of dropping the cap on SO2 emissions to 70 percent below the 2003 emissions level. In doing so, 
                                                          
1 The conference bill passed the House by a vote of 401 to 25 and passed the Senate 89 to 10. The law was then 
signed by President Bush on November 15, 1990.  
 
2 The actual article can be found at http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1987-04-04/news/8701250779_1_high-sulfur-
coal-acid-rain-clean-coal). 
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the EPA applied more stringent emission “caps” on eastern states that generated most of the 
visibility-reducing pollutants3 (Palmer and Evans 2009). Before the CAIR, facilities could 
pollute one ton of SO2 per each allowance regardless of their location. The new rule, however, 
required plants located in the 28 dirtier states (as shown in Figure 1) to surrender two allowances 
for every ton of SO2 emissions. As a consequence, the allowance price rose further, from $600 
per ton to $1,578 per ton in 2005 (as shown in Figure 2).   
 
 
Source: EPA Web Archive (https://archive.epa.gov/airmarkets/programs/cair/web/html/index.html) 
Figure 1. 28 states under the Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR). 
 
                                                          
3 Pollutants that reduce visibility include fine particulate matter (PM2.5) and compounds which contribute to PM2.5 
formation, such as nitrogen oxides (NOx), sulfur dioxides (SO2), ammonia and under certain conditions volatile 
organic compounds. For more information, visit http://www3.epa.gov/visibility/fs_2005_6_15.html.  
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Source: Evans and Woodward (2013). 
Figure 2. Spot market prices for SO2 allowances (2001–2011). 
 
After the CAIR was announced, however, a number of utilities and the state of North 
Carolina challenged the EPA (North Carolina v. EPA- No. 05-1244, D.C. Cir. July 11, 2008) in 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia (D.C.) Circuit (Evans and Woodward, 
2013; Schmalensee and Stavins, 2013). These parties raised questions about the EPA’s methods 
of managing the trading program, and the ways in which the EPA selected the 28 states. 
Additionally, some facilities questioned the EPA’s methods of distributing allowances using 
auction mechanism as the EPA mandated facilities to mandatorily submit 2.8 percent of the total 
amount of allowances received in a given year t4 to secure sufficient amount of allowances. As a 
                                                          
4 In particular, these facilities were questioning the use of auction annually held by the EPA. To supply the auctions 
with allowances, the EPA held an Auction Allowance Reserve of approximately 2.8 percent of the total annual 
allowances allocated to all units in March of each year. The purpose of the allowance auction was to set the market 
value of an allowance in a given year t for all market participants, including coal-fired facilities. To these facilities, 
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result, during this period, these facilities and other stakeholders referred to the program in 
derogatory terms such as “cap and tax” rather than “cap and trade,” questioning the purpose of 
the market-based policy (Schmalensee and Stavins, 2013). As shown in Figure 2, the price of an 
allowance started to drop in 2006 due to the legal uncertainty raised by the law suits. 
In 2008, the CAIR was initially vacated (struck down) by the D.C. Circuit, which asked 
the EPA for a major revision. However, the court decided to remain the CAIR until the EPA 
could come up with a new rule. The EPA filed for a rehearing of the DC Circuit’s decision to 
vacate the CAIR, but the Obama administration finally decided to drop the CAIR from the ARP 
and come up with new rules in 2010 (Schmalensee and Stavins, 2013). In 2012, the Obama 
administration finalized the wording of a new rule (known as the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule-
CSAPR) to replace the CAIR. After a number legal challenges associated with the CSAPR by 
state governments, the CAIR was again temporarily implemented. 
In 2010, multiple failed revisions had threatened stakeholder support for the ARP (Chan 
et al., 2012; Evans and Woodward, 2013). As a consequence, the D.C. court questioned the 
EPA’s ability to improve market-based solutions. By failing to resolve issues raised, the EPA 
appeared incompetent to market participants which also influenced stakeholders’ confidence in 
the trading market; in 2008, the average price of an allowance was $327 per ton. When the CAIR 
was temporarily adopted in 2010, the allowance price dropped to $38 per ton. In 2011, the per-
ton price went down even further, to less than two dollars. This was significantly lower than that 
of operating the cheapest filter ($50 ~ $100/ton) used to reduce SO2 emissions. For coal-fired 
facilities, this meant that consuming allowances could be more economical than operating filters. 
                                                          
submitting 2.8 percent of the total annual allowances was viewed as a “tax.” For more information, please visit 
http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/so2-allowance-auctions. 
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This new reality ran against the basic purpose of the policy which was to reduce, not to 
incentivize, SO2 emissions. In other words, the series of revision failures threatened the 
legitimacy of market mechanisms and the perceived value of an allowance (Evans and 
Woodword, 2013; Schmalensee and Stavins, 2013). In the next section, I discuss in depth about 
the failure of the CAIR and the EPA’s attempt to mend the broken policy.   
 
2.2.2. The failure of the CAIR  
When the ARP was initially enacted, the emphasis was on protecting the environment from 
acidification. In fact, the program’s beneficial impact on human health such as lung disease was 
completely unanticipated (Evans and Woodward, 2013; Schmalensee and Stavins, 2013). As a 
result, the cost-benefit analysis of the program required major revisions. In order to protect 
public health and the environment, the EPA promulgated the CAIR under the authority of the 
Clean Air Act (CAA) Title I.5 In doing so, based on monitoring data, the EPA designated states 
(as shown in Figure 1) that contributed to the transmission of fine particulate matter (PM2.5),
6 
which causes various lung diseases. Then, the CAIR SO2 program required all facilities operating 
in the selected states to surrender two allowances for one ton of emissions starting in 2010 and 
2.5 allowances for one ton of emissions for the affected region starting in 2015. The earlier 
                                                          
5 In particular, section 110(a)(2)(D)(i)(I) of Title I of the Clean Air Act states as follows;  
(i) . . .any source or other type of emissions activity within the State from emitting any air pollutant in amounts 
which will— 
(I) contribute significantly to nonattainment in, or interfere with maintenance by, any other State with respect to any 
such national primary or secondary ambient air quality standard……  
 
6 PM2.5, also known as fine particulate matter, is a byproduct of SO2 emissions.  
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allowance currency (1 allowance: 1 ton of emissions) was maintained for those states that were 
not affected by the new rule.   
The new rule created confusions among local state governments, policy makers, and coal-
fired facilities. In 2006, as previously mentioned, North Carolina sued the EPA in the D.C. 
Circuit because the CAIR was not stringent enough to protect the air quality of North Carolina 
from pollution generated in nearby states such as Georgia (Boyle, 2008). During the trial, the 
court found that the CAIR had a few critical flaws. First, the court questioned the EPA’s methods 
for setting up a new cap. The court stated that the CAIR SO2 emission caps were “arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law (North Carolina v. 
EPA, 531 F.3d 896, D.C. Cir. 2008: p 12.).” That is, the court indicated that the EPA’s 
estimation for setting the new cap was unclear and its effectiveness lacked logical validity7.  
Additionally, the D.C. Circuit also stated that the EPA did not have the legitimate 
authority and the adequate knowledge to adjust the value of allowances (Evans and Woodward, 
2013). The court confirmed that the CAA, a federal law designed to control air pollution on a 
national level, did not confer any authority on the EPA to limit or terminate SO2 allowances
8 
issued under Title IV. In other words, the EPA could not modify an interstate allowance trading 
system without the approval of Congress. For stakeholders, this meant that the EPA failed to 
present the optimal value of an allowance for emissions to prevent the spread of acid rain 
pollutants across states.  
                                                          
7 The court ruling states that “it is unclear how the quantitative number of allowances created by 1990 legislation to 
address one substance, acid rain, could be relevant to 2015 levels of an air pollutant, PM2.5.”  The court also noted 
that “[a]part from the arbitrary Title IV baseline, the EPA has insufficiently explained how it arrived at the 50% and 
65% reduction figures (North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896, D.C. Cir. 2008, p. 36).”  
 
8 “So too here: no statute confers authority on EPA to terminate or limit Title IV(SO2) allowances, and the EPA thus 
has none (North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896, D.C. Cir. 2008, p. 44)” 
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In vacating the CAIR, the court ruling finalized that “the EPA’s approach —region wide 
caps with no state-specific quantitative contribution determinations or emissions requirements—
is fundamentally flawed” and that the EPA must “redo its analysis from the ground up” (North 
Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896, D.C. Cir. 2008: p. 59). The court’s decision was unexpected by 
local stakeholders and the state of North Carolina who initially sued the EPA as it was 
inconsistent with a previous holding (Tait, 2009). During this period the EPA appealed to the 
Supreme Court for review of this decision. When the Obama administration decided drop the 
appeal in 2010, market uncertainties increased as the statement signaled to market participants 
that “the government can undo what it created” (Schmalensee and Stavins, 2013; p. 113). When 
the court decided to vacate the CAIR, the price of an allowance immediately fell by 62 percent9 
(as shown in Figure 2). 
 
2.2.3 After the CAIR- Cross State Air Pollution Rule (CSAPR)  
While accepting the finding of critical flaws of the CAIR, the EPA requested the Court not to 
wholly vacate the rules because approaches used in the CAIR were partly in line with previous 
court rulings10 associated with inter-state transmission of pollutants (Evans & Woodward, 2013). 
However, in April 2010 the Obama administration decided to drop the appeal of the ruling, and 
the Court allowed the CAIR to come into effect until the EPA issued a replacement regulation 
that addressed all the concerns above (Bravender 2010; Schmalensee and Stavins, 2013).  
                                                          
9 On that day (July 11, 2008), the price fell from $327 to $124 (Evans and Woodward, 2013).   
 
10 Michigan v. EPA (213 F.3d 663, (D.C. Cir. 2000)), Virginia v. EPA (108 F.3d 1397 (D.C. Cir. 1997)) 
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On July 6, 2011 the EPA finalized the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule (CSAPR), which 
attempted to minimize air pollutions from states that affect other states’ air quality. As in the 
CAIR, the new rule also required selected states (as shown in Figure 3) to limit emissions based 
on natural environments (e.g. wind directions) and standards set at the state level. That is, the 
annual SO2 cap varied across 23 states affected by the rule; “7 states require relatively little 
emissions reductions to bring downwind monitors into attainment. The other 16 states require 
greater emissions reductions before a sufficient number of downwind monitors are forecast to 
come into attainment (Evans and Woodward, 2013; p. 336).” Moreover, allowance transfer was 
limited for those facilities operating in the 16 states through complex legal procedures. As a 
consequence, the idea of using federal market mechanisms, which allowed unlimited allowance 
transactions across states, as a policy instrument to reduce SO2 emissions ended.     
 
Source: EPA’s Clean Air Markets (2017). https://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/map-states-covered-csapr 
Figure 3. Map of states covered by CSAPR  
 
 24 
 
 
As shown in Table 1, the CSAPR also went through major revisions between 2011 and 
2017. During this period, the legal battles between the EPA and the penalized states by the 
CSAPR hindered the implementation of the program. To maintain the air quality at the federal 
level, the CAIR remained in effect until the court accepted the revision in 2016. Nonetheless, the  
Table 1. Series of events associated with Cross State Air Pollution Rule (CSAPR) 
Date Events 
6-Jul-2011 
The EPA finalized the CSAPR in order to replace the Clean Air Interstate Rule 
(CAIR). The new rule required eastern and central states to prevent emissions that 
may cross state boarders.  
5-Jun-2012 The EPA reviewed and issued several adjustments to the rule. 
21-Aug-2012 D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals overturned the CSAPR. CAIR remained in place.  
 Jun- 2013 
14 states challenged the Cross State Air Pollution Rule (CSAPR) in federal court: 
Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Nebraska, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. The states were 
joined by several labor groups, such as the United Mine Workers of America, and 
electric utility groups, such as the Utility Air Regulatory Group11. 
29-Apr-2014 
The United States Supreme Court reversed the decision of the D. C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals.  
26-Jun-2014 
The United States federal government files its motion with the D. C. Circuit Court  
of Appeals to lift its stay. Until the motion is decided, the earlier law (CAIR) remains 
in effect. 
23-Oct-2014 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit ordered that EPA's motion to  
lift the stay of the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule be granted. CSAPR Phase I  
implementation scheduled for 2015. 
16-Nov-2015 EPA proposed the updated CSAPR rule 
7-Sep-2016 Final Cross-State Air Pollution Rule Update 
3-Nov-2016 
EPA proposed to remove Texas from the CSAPR SO2 and annual NOX trading 
programs. 
21-Sep-2017 
The Cross State Air Pollution Rule applied to 26 states: Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, 
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, 
Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, 
and Wisconsin 
Sources: https://www.epa.gov/csapr/cross-state-air-pollution-rule-additional-actions 
                                                          
11 U.S. Supreme Court, "EPA v. EME Homer City Generation - Brief for the states and local respondents in 
opposition," June 2013.  
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confidence in the market broke down for two reasons. First, as noted, the court refused to accept 
the idea of exchanging allowances across states. Second, multiple revisions raised questions 
about the value of an allowance as a stable asset. When the CSAPR was finalized in 2012, the 
price of an allowance had fallen to less than $3. Today, the ARP still remains as an active rule. 
But the price of an allowance is less than $112 which means that the value of an allowance has 
hardly any effect on the reduction of emissions.  
Interestingly, as shown in Figure 4, the policy had enduring effects despite the weakening 
of its main mechanism. That is, the levels of emissions continued to drop even after the 
perceived effectiveness of the allowance market was challenged. Considering the lack of 
confidence in the market and the low allowance price, there were opportunities to increase (or at  
 
Source: EPA’s Clean Air Market Data Base (2017).  
Figure 4. SO2 emissions of coal-fired power plants across U.S. (1995–2011). 
                                                          
12 In the 2017 auction, the price of a ‘spot’ allowance, an allowance that could be used immediately, was sold at 
$ 0.75. 
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least maintain the current level of) emissions or disregard the questionable market. Based on data 
provided by the EPA, neither of these cases occurred. Why did coal-fired facilities maintain their 
efforts to reduce SO2 emissions despite the opportunities to exploit the failures in the ARP 
market?  
According to Schmalensee and Stavins (2013), economists have argued that the technological 
development of filters (scrubbers), the optimization of mixing high and low-sulfur coal for 
electricity generation, and the rise of natural gas as a substitute for coal are the main reasons for 
the decline in emissions despite the allowance market conditions. However, while economists 
have focused on technological developments and energy market factors that contributed to the 
additional drop in emissions, how local sociopolitical contexts contributed to coal-fired facilities’ 
environmental performance has been relatively overlooked. In this dissertation, I do not attempt 
to reject the effect of monetary incentives or technological developments on SO2 emissions. 
Rather, in the next chapter (Chapter 3) I explore how sociopolitical context at the state level 
compelled coal power plants to maintain their conformity with a questionable policy (ARP) at 
the federal level.  
 
2.3 Sociopolitical context of the ARP 
    2.3.1 Formal sociopolitical environment and the ARP   
When George H.W. Bush won the presidential election in 1988, he promised to revise the CAA 
and become “the Environmental President” in order to gain political support from voters in 
swing states who had been increasingly interested in environmental conservation (Chan et al., 
2012; p. 27). His campaign received favorable attention from these voters because the prior 
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presidential administration (under President Ronald Reagan) had lacked interest in enacting 
regulations as a means of addressing public policy problems. While inheriting Raegan’s 
Republican free market ideology, Bush, on the other hand, emphasized the importance of cutting 
acid rain pollutants13 (Evans and Woodward, 2013). Since economic growth began to decrease in 
the late 1980s, the Bush administration had to find a way to devise a cost-effective policy that 
would not only minimize the economic impact of environmental regulations but also cut SO2 
emissions by half (Chan et al., 2012; Schmalensee and Stavins, 2013). To resolve these 
contradictory issues, regulating coal-fired facilities with market-based approaches was 
introduced by the new administration.  
When a market-based policy was considered in Congress between 1989 and 1990, 
political debates around environmental issues were not determined by party ideology (e.g. 
Democratic v. Republican). Even within the same political party, policy debates were mostly 
driven by economic impacts on particular states (Chan et al., 2012; Schmalensee and Stavins, 
2013). For example, within the Democratic Party, on the one hand, Henry Waxman of California 
showed full support for the CAA as his state was struggling with smog and acid rain pollutants. 
On the other hand, Jon Dingell of Michigan was against the CAA because his political support 
mostly came from the automobile industry, which had been associated with coal-intensive 
industries. Moreover, the Majority Leader of the Senate at that time, Robert Byrd (Democratic) 
had not been in favor of the CAA as he represented West Virginia, a state with high reliance on 
coal mining. As a consequence, the coalition was not large enough to secure votes to pass the 
CAA.   
                                                          
13 The speech of Bush on environmental policy can be found at https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-
speeches/february-9-1989-address-joint-session-congress 
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The political climate changed in 1988 when George Mitchell, a Democratic Senator of 
Maine, was elected as the Majority Leader of the Senate. He had been pressured by voters to fix 
air quality problems as the state of Maine was seriously affected by acid rain pollutants during 
this period (Chan et al., 2012). As the Majority Leader, Mitchell was motivated to negotiate with 
the Republicans and the Bush administration to secure enough votes to pass the CAA and as a 
result, the bill passed the House by a vote of 401 to 25 and passed the Senate 89 to 10.14  
After 20 years, however, environmental issues became tightly aligned with political 
ideologies, reflecting partisan (Republicans vs. Democrats) separations (Shipan and Lowry, 
2001). For example, in 2010 the U.S. Senate attempted to apply cap-and trade mechanisms to cut 
carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. During the debate, Republicans criticized their own invention 
(cap-and-trade) as an ineffective tool and argued that an allowance acted as an unnecessary tax 
on coal-fired facilities (Schmalensee and Stavins, 2013). The lack of political support for the 
“cap-and-trade” mechanism later contributed to the collapse of the SO2 allowance market as 
stakeholders questioned the legitimacy of the allowance.   
 
    2.3.2 Informal sociopolitical environment  
In this section, I introduce how environmental movement organizations responded to events 
associated with the ARP. This is an important question because while many studies explored 
how formal sociopolitical actors, such as government officials and the Congress, reacted to the 
                                                          
14 The percent of Senators and House members voting ‘yea’ for the Clean Air Act Amendments;   
 
 Senate House 
Democrats 96% 91% 
Republicans 87% 87% 
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first market-based policy, the role and response of informal sociopolitical actors associated with 
the ARP have been relatively overlooked.   
As previously mentioned, in the beginning most environmental movement organizations 
(EMOs) opposed the idea of using market mechanisms as policy instruments for several reasons. 
First, although environmentalists partly accepted the validity of the allowance trading program at 
the national level in terms of emission reductions, viewing an allowance as a license to pollute 
led to other concerns such as creating “hot spots” where the level of emissions is relatively 
higher than in other regions (Stavins, 1998; p.72). In other words, activists perceived allowances 
as rights to pollute rather than regulatory constraints. Others criticized the ethics behind trading 
allowances; they believed that quantifying and financializing issues related to human health and 
ecological welfare was not only impossible but also unethical (Kelman, 1981; Stavins, 1998). 
Lastly, EMOs objected to the cap-and-trade for political reasons. Because the level of the 
emissions cap would be set on a consensus between political parties, they feared that the level of 
emission cap would be (politically) difficult to adjust (in particular- a tightening the cap) once 
implemented (Stavins, 1998). In short, to EMOs, preserving the environment through a 
capitalistic approach was viewed as an impossible endeavor.  
  To incorporate the strong voice of the environmental community, the Reagan 
administration invited the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), representing EMOs, to take part 
in designing the market-based policy. The administration hoped that the inclusion of the EDF 
would provide support from other environmental activists. The EDF15 also sought this 
opportunity to distinguish their movement identity from that of other environmental movements 
                                                          
15 EDF Executive Director Fred Krupp, Senior Economist Daniel Dudek, and Staff Attorney Joseph Goffman 
worked closely with the White House to develop the initial allowance trading proposal (Stavins, 1998). 
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by fixing environmental problems through a capitalistic approach– the market (Stavins, 1998). 
The cooptation strategy eventually paid off in 1983 (as shown in Figure 5) when the Reagan 
administration received support from 13 major EMOs in the U.S. The actual bill was signed in 
1990 by Reagan’s successor, George W Bush. As shown in Figure 6, EMOs were invited to the 
signing ceremony along with lobbyists and Democrats (The Washington Post, 16 November. 
1990). Overall, during the 1980s, EMOs changed their position from opponents to supporters of 
the ARP.  
 
 
Source: United Press International (1983) 
Figure 5. News article about SMOs’ asking for the ARP 
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Source: Washington Post (1990) 
Figure 6. News article about Bush administration accepting the Clean Air Act, 1990  
 
 
Today, most EMOs maintain their support for the ARP. For example, the Sierra Club 
states that it supports a national goal to reduce the level of SO2 and other acid rain pollutants 
within the ARP framework.16 Other EMOs, such as the Defenders of Wildlife, the EDF, the 
National Parks Conservation Association, the WildEarth Guardians, Greenpeace, and so forth,17 
allied with the Sierra Club and filed legal suits against the EPA and coal-fired facilities for not 
performing certain mandatory duties required by the ARP (e.g. Sierra Club v. Gina McCarthy, 
2016 and Sierra Club et al v. Portland General Electric Company, 2013). Others such as the 
Acid Rain Retirement Funds maintained their investment in the allowance market as their key 
                                                          
16 https://www.sierraclub.org/policy/pollution-waste-management/acid-rain 
 
17 This information can be found in the Bloomberg law docket search program (https://www.bloomberglaw.com).  
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strategy; they bought allowances to increase the price of an allowance and dumped allowances in 
order to decrease the emissions cap.      
One thing to note is that the Sierra Club (along with its allies) attempted to maintain the 
effectiveness of the ARP when the policy was being challenged by stakeholders. As shown, in 
Figure 7, the data from Bloomberg lawsuits search program shows that between 2000 and 2009 
the Sierra Club pursued 32 legal actions associated with SO2 emissions and the ARP with its 
allies. However, when the validity of the ARP was being challenged by stakeholders between 
2010 and 2011, the number of lawsuits filed by EMOs at the federal court increased significantly 
to 56, which was a 75 percent increase in two years. Between 2012 and 2016, the number of 
lawsuits filed soared to 241. In other words, regardless of the validity of the ARP, these EMOs 
sought movement opportunities within the ARP framework rather than rejecting the market-
based policy. 
 
Source: Bloomberg law docket search program (https://www.bloomberglaw.com). 
Figure 7. The number of lawsuits filed at the federal court by the Sierra Club, 2000–2016  
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Using the context of the ARP, the next chapter explores how the influence of social 
movements and other formal and informal state-level sociopolitical contexts on coal-fired 
facilities changed when the federal regulatory environment no longer served the purpose for 
which it was designed. Based on the historical context of the ARP, In the analysis, I compare 
coal-fired facilities operating in two different time periods: when the ARP was perceived as an 
effective regulation by stakeholders (2003–2009) versus when the policy’s perceived 
effectiveness was questioned by stakeholders (2010–2011). I exclude the period after the CSAPR 
was finalized (2012–) because the court asked the EPA to limit allowances exchange across 
facilities in different states. In other words, after 2012, the initial idea of transferring unlimited 
amount of allowances across facilities regardless of geographic boundaries ended.   
 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a brief history and the sociopolitical context of the 
ARP. As noted, the first market-based environmental policy at the federal level was established 
and implemented based on political calculations and pressures from the environmental 
community. The formal and informal sociopolitical actors both responded dynamically to 
changes associated with the federal law but in different directions. On the one hand, the 
polarization of politics led Republicans to question the validity of the policy they had once 
created. In this vein, according Schmalensee and Stavins (2013), the lack of political support 
eventually threatened the legitimacy of the ARP. On the other hand, informal sociopolitical 
actors who initially opposed the idea of applying market mechanisms to control emissions 
maintained their support for the ARP. In this dissertation, I argue that the impact of the ARP on 
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coal-fired facilities provides many scholarly lessons from the vantage point of institutional and 
social movement theories. 
First, the history of the ARP allows researchers to examine how institutional effects are 
maintained over time. While previous studies assume that organizations would further conform 
to regulatory standards at the federal level when normative pressures at the local level were 
aligned with these standards, the ARP provides an interesting research setting to examine how 
legally-challenged policies maintain their regulatory effects. As noted, the major trading rules 
associated with the allowance market were challenged by stakeholders, leading to a collapse of 
the market. Nonetheless, facilities continued to reduce their emissions. Economists have pointed 
to the development of new technologies or lowered transportation costs as the cause of the 
additional drop in emissions (Schmalensee and Stavins, 2013). However, they have ignored the 
role of the informal sociopolitical context on facilities’ polluting activities after the validity of 
the federal policy was challenged. In this sense, the context of the ARP allows future scholars to 
explore how informal sociopolitical contexts maintain the effect of questionable formal policies 
(Scott, 2013). 
Second, to social scientists, the history of the ARP provides a rich opportunity to expand 
our knowledge of institutional environments. As noted, the market-based policy integrates 
market mechanisms with regulatory institutions. Early institutionalists distinguished the 
“institutional environment” from the “competitive marketplace,” viewing market behavior as 
driven solely by efficiency concerns and competition (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; p.147). A 
market-based policy like the ARP, however, renders it impossible to differentiate the two 
environments; it serves as a regulatory institution based on market mechanisms. In other words, 
the trading of allowances by market participants reflects a combination of regulatory constraint 
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(caps) and economic, independent (and presumably rational) decision-making. Therefore, the 
ARP requires a new theoretical framework to understand how markets act as socially constructed 
fields (Fligstein, 2001; Fligstein and Calder, 2015). 
In addition, while prior studies have mainly focused on the role of SMOs as change 
agents or challengers that stimulate institutional change (King and Pearce, 2010), the 
sociopolitical background of the ARP suggests that these organizations could also serve as 
agents for maintaining institutional effectiveness when a regulation that favors the goals of the 
movement starts to break down. According to Scott (2013), sometimes formal or informal 
institutional elements can substitute for the roles of others to maintain institutional resilience. For 
institutions to persist, meaning systems and norms must be transmitted and communicated in 
plausible ways so that new members or challengers can accept their “fact-like” quality (Tolbert, 
1988: 103). In this respect, SMOs acted as incumbents rather than challengers to maintain the 
norms and values of the ARP. In the next chapter, I empirically examine how formal and 
informal sociopolitical actors replaced the role of the federal policy in order to preserve the 
social order (i.e. to lower the SO2 level).  
This is in line with literature stating that institutions are maintained by interactions 
between formalized rules and informal common understandings. According Zucker (1986), the 
two institutional elements substitute for each other as the increase in one domain reduces the 
need for the other (Durkheim and Halls, 1984; Garfinkel, 1963; Zucker, 1986). The ARP 
provides a unique opportunity to test this idea by exploring how informal coercive elements, 
such as SMOs or citizens’ political ideology, at the local level could take over the role of a 
questionable federal policy. In a broader context, the results imply that a broken policy at the 
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federal level could still maintain its effectiveness at the state level as long as the local community 
supports the underlying values of the federal policy.     
Together, the ARP addresses another important theoretical question: How can 
institutional stability be achieved when institutionalized rules, norms, and beliefs are 
constantly challenged by the environment? If we view institutionalization as an objectified 
state that increases the cost of nonconformity through self-reproducing mechanisms, this 
question will be difficult to resolve. However, as Zucker (1988: 26) notes, maintaining an 
institutionalized state requires “continuous action” intended to maintain existing order. 
Without these efforts, “institutions would simply decay into cultural artifacts” (Dacin et al., 
2010: 1395).  
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CHAPTER 3.  
WHEN DO ORGANIZATIONS PAY MORE ATTENTION TO LOCAL SOCIAL 
MOVEMENTS? COAL-FIRED FACILITIES’ SULFUR DIOXIDE (SO2) EMISSIONS 
UNDER THE ACID RAIN PROGRAM, 2003~2011 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Management scholars have examined how social movements influence organizations to make 
changes aligned with social values. Recent research in this vein has examined how activists 
directly or indirectly stimulate organizations to adopt innovative practices and policies such as 
corporate social responsibility initiatives, LGBT employee practices, and proenvironmental 
policies (Bartley, 2003; Hoffman, 2001; King & Pearce, 2010; Raeburn, 2004; Soule, 2009). 
According to these studies, local social movement activists influence target organizations in a 
community through surveillance (constant monitoring), boycotts, protests, and so forth (King, 
2008; Soule, 2009; Reid & Toffel, 2009; King & Pearce, 2010). In this process, social movement 
organizations (SMOs) often act as change agents that challenge current normative standards and 
legitimize new institutional expectations across organizational fields.  
In previous studies, however, the relationship between local sociopolitical influences and 
upper-level (e.g. national level) institutional environments is described as a simple dichotomy 
between whether they reinforce each other or not. For example, scholars have found that 
organizations located in regions with progressive sociopolitical norms and values tend to engage 
more in prosocial or pro-environmental activities to meet their local demands and standards (Lee 
and Lounsbury, 2015; Marquis et al., 2016; Luo et al., 2017; Sine and Lee, 2009). Although 
these studies find the enduring influence of local institutional contexts and SMOs on targeted 
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organizations, they neglected to consider how institutional contexts at the national level (upper 
level) could concurrently shape organizational behaviors. This leads us to assume that for 
targeted organizations, institutional contexts serve to increase resistance to or compliance with 
rules and standards accepted at the federal level (Lounsbury, 2001; Marquis and Lounsbury, 
2007; Greenwood et al., 2011). In other words, our knowledge of how the relationship between 
SMOs’ activism and targeted organizations’ activities at the state level is influenced by the 
national institutional environment (upper-level) is limited. 
In this chapter, I propose that evaluating the direct influence of SMOs and other local 
sociopolitical contexts on organizations requires a more dynamic approach that includes 
consideration of institutional contexts at different levels in society. This is an important 
theoretical issue because our understanding of how the interaction between global (upper-level) 
and local (lower-level) sociopolitical contexts along with SMOs shapes organizational decisions 
is limited. To address this problem, I argue that the direct influence of local social movements or 
local sociopolitical contexts on targeted organizations may vary depending on the effectiveness 
of a regulation at the federal level that is associated with movement activities. 
Similarly, some social movement studies also provide insights into how federal 
regulations might affect the influence of local sociopolitical actors, such as local governments, 
social movement organizations (SMO), and elites, on organizations located within the region. In 
particular, the political mediation model proposes that movements are more influential in some 
institutional contexts than in others (Briscoe and Gupta, 2016; King, 2008), and, specifically, that 
a local movement’s mobilization and opportunity structures depend on having a favorable 
sociopolitical climate (Amenta, Carruthers, and Zylan, 1992; Amenta, Dunleavy, and Bernstein, 
1994; Amenta and Young, 1999; Cress and Snow, 2000; Soule and Olzak, 2004; King, 2008). 
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According to these scholars, the direct influence of SMOs on target organizations is more likely 
to diminish when a regulation supporting these activists is enacted, as stakeholders and 
community members tend to focus more on policy implementation and to perceive legal 
enactment as the end of a social movement’s life cycle (McAdam and Su, 2002; Cornwall et al., 
2007; Olzak and Soule, 2009). In other words, federal level laws may change the influence of 
local sociopolitical actors on organizations by shifting their attention to the implementation of 
the federal policy.  
Building on these perspectives, in the current paper I demonstrate that when actors 
believed in the efficacy of federal legislation, state-level (local) sociopolitical influences—such 
as social movements or citizens’ political ideology—may lose their impact on target 
organizations. This is because the validity of a federal law directs key stakeholders’ attention 
toward the implementation of the formalized rules, reducing the opportunity for further 
movement mobilization (Olzak and Soule, 2009; Amenta et al., 2010; Ostrom, 2015). From a 
political mediation standpoint, this means that the critical condition for SMOs to pressure their 
target groups— the attention of local citizens and governments on movement activities (the 
political mediation link at the local level) — is weakened by the effectiveness of the federal 
policy. 
Moreover, although the purpose of federal regulation is to control target organizations’ 
activities, compliance provides a signal of “good faith” efforts to address problems (Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977; Tolbert and Zucker, 1996). Therefore, when local stakeholders accept a federal 
regulation as valid, the need for organizations to attend to local norms and culture associated 
with the law is reduced. In contrast, when these stakeholders no longer perceive the federal 
regulation as being effective, targeted organizations are likely to become more responsive to 
 40 
 
local (state-level) normative and cultural pressures to signal their “good faith” as local 
stakeholders seek target organizations’ sociopolitical legitimacy from local sociopolitical 
initiatives.  
Using the data on coal-fired facilities’ sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions under the Acid 
Rain Program (ARP) between 2003 and 2011, my results show that state-level SMOs had a 
greater impact on coal-fired facilities’ emissions of SO2 when the validity of the federal law 
(ARP) was brought into question by stakeholders. When the ARP was accepted as a proper 
regulatory framework (2003–2009), state governments, elites, citizens, and even movement 
activists focused on the implementation of the federal policy. By conforming to the federal 
policy, coal-fired facilities were able to avoid independent pressure from state-level 
sociopolitical actors to reduce acid rain pollutants. As stakeholders’ attention towards the federal 
policy increased, coal-fired plants became less attentive to state-level norms and values 
associated with SO2 emissions.   
However, when the policy’s legitimacy was threatened (2010–2011), the direct impact of 
SMOs and other sociopolitical contexts at the state level on facilities’ emissions increased. 
During this period, the perceived effectiveness of the ARP was challenged by stakeholders, as 
the price of an allowance became significantly lower than the price of other means of pollution 
control (e.g., operating filters). The controversy over the effectiveness of market mechanisms 
associated with the ARP shifted the attention of local governments and citizens from policy 
implementation at the federal level to state-level environmental initiatives. As a result, coal-fired 
plants became more responsive to state-level pro-environmental contexts because the operational 
certainty expected from policy compliance disappeared.   
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The current study has several theoretical and practical implications. First, I extend the 
political mediation model by differentiating the role of federal and local sociopolitical contexts 
when discussing the effectiveness of SMOs. From this perspective, my results test the political 
mediation theory by showing how an accepted federal policy dampens the direct influence of 
SMOs at the state level. However, when state-level governments, activists, and citizens no longer 
trust the effectiveness of the law, the direct influence of state-level SMOs on local organizations 
rises again. This insight contributes to organizational research by showing that the association 
between federal regulation and local sociopolitical contexts is not necessarily additive but is 
substitutive, and that evaluating the direct influence of local sociopolitical pressures on 
organizations thus requires a more dynamic approach that considers institutional contexts at 
different societal levels. 
In addition, the study contributes to the non-market strategy literature (Hiatt and Park, 
2013; Carlos and Lewis, 2017; Durand and Georgallis, 2017; Hiatt, Carlos, and Sine, 2018) by 
demonstrating that organizations pay differential attention to local and societal-level 
sociopolitical factors depending on the relative legitimacy of these factors. Understanding how 
this interplay between local and societal-level factors affects organizations is important for both 
theoretical and practical reasons. Theoretically, it speaks to recent research that conceptualizes 
institutions as “temporary truces” (Meyer & Höllerer, 2010: 1251). The study also answers 
recent calls in the literature for a better understanding of how organizations respond when the 
“temporary truce” falters (Meyer and Hammerschmid, 2006; Raynard and Greenwood, 2014; 
Nicolini et al., 2016), in other words, to the deinstitutionalization of previously taken-for-granted 
social practices. Specifically, it shows that when an issue previously settled at the societal level 
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reemerges as a contested subject, organizations respond by attending to their most proximal (i.e., 
local) sociopolitical environment. 
Practically, this insight has important strategic implications for organizations. For 
example, it suggests that organizations with operations in multiple locations need to change how 
they address the once-again contested issue. My theory and empirical findings suggest that when 
an issue has been settled at the societal level, these organizations can implement a generalist non-
market strategy. That is, they can implement the same compliance strategy in all of their 
locations. When contestation at the societal level reemerges, these organizations need to adopt 
more of a niche (i.e., location-specific) strategy as local stakeholders’ attention increases.  
THEORY DEVELOPMENT AND HYPOTHESES 
The Political Mediation Approach: When Do SMOs Matter?   
Similar to state government organizations, local social movement activists can act as informal 
coercive actors that pressure targeted organizations to adhere to the local value system 
(Lounsbury et al., 2003; Hiatt et al., 2009; Sine and Lee, 2009; Lee and Lounsbury, 2015). For 
example, Lounsbury (2001) showed that universities with student groups connected to strong 
environmental movement activism were more likely to hire full-time recycling managers who 
adopted pro-environmental practices. Lee and Lounsbury (2015) found that facilities operating in 
states with strong environmental movement organizations, such as the Sierra Club, were more 
likely to improve their environmental performance by reducing the release of toxic chemicals. 
SMOs use tactics such as protests, constant monitoring, and legal actions to pressure targeted 
groups to meet their standards (Tilly, 2004; Campbell, 2007). Moreover, they often mobilize 
local media campaigns and collaborate with other SMOs to bring public attention to firms that do 
not meet their standards (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; King, 2008).  
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The political mediation model explains the influence of SMOs in politics. While most 
social movement studies have focused on the consequences of movement activities (e.g., policy 
adoption or institutional change), political mediation theory aims to explore the conditions under 
which SMOs have significant influence in achieving their goals. In this view, the strength of 
movements (i.e., their capacity to mobilize resources through their opportunity structure in the 
political system) is a necessary but insufficient condition for the attainment of movement goals 
(Amenta et al., 1994; Amenta et al., 2010). That is, SMOs’ efforts to initiate change require a 
favorable sociopolitical context, which is composed of support from state agencies, elites, and 
citizens who can directly influence policy outcomes (Soule and Olzak, 2004; Amenta et al., 
2010). 
Without a supportive political climate, SMOs often receive less attention or even 
negative attention from other actors, which hinders resource mobilization (Dixon, 2008; Amenta 
et al., 2010). According to scholars (Burstein and Linton, 2002; Soule and Olzak, 2004), political 
ideology is often measured as an indicator of SMOs’ favorable sociopolitical climate because it 
provides “incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectations for 
success or failure” (Tarrow, 1994: 85). For example, in their study of anti-chain-store laws in the 
United States, Ingram and Rao (2004) suggested that activists were likely to achieve their goals 
in a favorable political context because they encountered less countermovement activity. Others 
found that the level of democratization prevalent in a region influences the capacity of SMOs to 
mobilize resources and achieve their goals (Tilly, 2004). Their results imply that for a movement 
to be influential, the interest of formal institutional actors (e.g., elected officials or state 
bureaucrats) and the support from citizens in the region should be aligned with SMOs’ goals 
(Kane, 2003; Amenta et al., 2010).  
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When a federal regulation is taken for granted by stakeholders (as was the ARP during 
the period 2003–2009), the direct influence of activists on target organizations is more likely to 
diminish because local government officials and citizens focus on the implementation of the 
federal law. This in turn makes it harder for SMOs to mobilize resources from citizens and to 
take advantage of opportunities arising from the local political environment. For instance, Olzak 
and Soule (2009) found that while protests conducted by environmental movement organizations 
had a significant impact on environmental policies at the agenda-setting stage, these activities no 
longer had direct effects at later stages, as political actors shifted their attention to the 
implementation of the law. Others found that the influence of SMOs is likely to be weakened 
when a policy (that addresses the concerns of SMOs) is enacted as stakeholders and community 
members perceive legal enactment as the end of a social movement’s life cycle and show less 
support for SMOs’ activities (McAdam and Su, 2002; Cornwall et al., 2007; Olzak and Soule, 
2009). Therefore, if political mediation theory holds more generally, then the direct influence of 
local SMOs on organizations may weaken as the taken-for-grantedness of the federal law shifts 
key stakeholders’ attention from the cause of a problem to the issue of implementing the 
regulation (Amenta et al., 2010). 
Moreover, when a federal regulation is legitimate, local SMOs influence their target 
organizations through the law. For instance, during my study period, SMOs challenged the EPA 
through legal actions to force it to include dirtier regions in the CAIR to further pressure 
facilities operating in those regions (Sierra Club v. EPA, No. 04-1243, 38 ELR 20215, D.C. Cir. 
Aug. 19, 2008). The Sierra Club has also collaborated with other local environmentalists to 
investigate fraudulent calculations that may have been involved in the self-reporting process 
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associated with toxic gases.18 Other pro-environmental actors, such as the Acid Rain Retirement 
Funds, participated in the allowance market by consistently buying and hoarding allowances to 
reduce their total supply at the national level. That is, when the effectiveness of the ARP was 
trusted by stakeholders, SMOs concentrated on the implementation of the federal law, and thus 
the effect of SMOs on target polluters was replaced by the federal law.  
In addition, corporations, which are often targeted by local sociopolitical actors, also shift 
their attention to the federal law. Even though the purpose of a federal regulation is to control 
target organizations’ activities, it also provides a legitimate tool to stably operate within legal 
boundaries regardless of geographic location. For example, in the case of the ARP, coal-fired 
facilities obtained allowances from either the EPA or the market. In theory, an allowance 
represented the protected right at the federal level to emit one ton of SO2. This meant that 
emitting one ton of emission with an allowance was accepted by local stakeholders and 
sociopolitical actors. Given that local sociopolitical actors accepted the legitimacy of an 
allowance when the federal policy was taken for granted, it is likely that target organizations 
such as coal-fired facilities would focus their attention on the federal law, but pay less attention 
to local sociopolitical actors including SMOs. 
However, when formal regulatory actors (e.g. government officials) began to question the 
legitimacy of the federal regulation (2010–2011), I propose that the direct impact of informal 
regulatory actors such as SMOs on coal-fired facilities increased because activists tried to make 
firms comply with the law, which had lost its credibility as a means of controlling SO2 
emissions. As noted in the previous chapter, when the ARP was being challenged (2010-2011), 
                                                          
18 Jacobs, 2009, “An air of deceit” from the Pasadena Weekly (https://www.pasadenaweekly.com/2009/08/20/an-air-
of-deceit).  
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SMOs (e.g. Sierra Club, Environmental Defense Fund, Greenpeace, Defenders of Wild Life, 
National Parks Conservation Association, etc.)19 teamed up to pursue legal actions on SO2 
producing corporations and electric utilities that violated provisions associated with the ARP. As 
shown in Figure 8, the federal court data demonstrates that between 2003 and 2009, the Sierra 
Club pursued 28 legal actions associated with ARP and SO2 emissions. When the validity of the 
ARP was questioned by stakeholders (between 2010 and 2011), the number of lawsuits filed in 
federal court increased about 50 percent20. During this period, other activists, such as the Acid 
Rain Retirement Fund, maintained their movement strategy (purchasing allowances and then 
taking them off the market) despite the questionable value of an allowance. These examples 
present SMOs’ effort to maintain the effectiveness of the ARP during the period when market 
mechanisms were challenged. 
 
Source: Bloomberg law docket search program (https://www.bloomberglaw.com) 
Figure 8. The count of lawsuits filed by Sierra Club involving SO2 emissions between 2000-
2012 
 
                                                          
19 This information can be found in the Bloomberg law docket search program (https://www.bloomberglaw.com).  
 
20 The Sierra Club along with other environmental movement organizations filed 64 lawsuits in 2012.    
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Furthermore, when environmental regulations supported by activists are challenged, 
SMOs could threaten their target organizations by attempting to reshape the current 
sociopolitical landscape with new agendas. To expand the scope of issues covered by the 
environmental movement, activists look for other relevant SMOs based on cultural similarities or 
other like attributes (Jung et al., 2014). During the study period, for example, some SMOs (the 
Sierra Club and the Natural Resources Defense Council) linked their activities to the American 
Lung Association to incorporate public health concerns associated with detrimental small 
particles in an attempt to further reduce SO2 emissions. The Sierra Club then launched its 
“Beyond Coal Campaign” in 2010, pressuring local governments to adopt tougher environmental 
rules and to shut down local coal-fired facilities based on additional concerns associated with 
acid rain pollutants.   
In sum, I argue that the influence of local SMOs on target organizations is likely to 
increase when the perceived effectiveness of federal policy that was once supported by the 
movement is challenged. First, when the efficacy of a given national law is challenged, SMOs 
act as informal coercive actors to maintain target organizations’ compliance with a questionable 
regulation supported by activists. Second, the questionable policy at the federal level lead local 
SMOs to shift attention from federal policy implementation to local environmental initiatives. I 
therefore hypothesize that 
H1. The influence of local social movement organizations on coal-fired facilities’ 
environmental performance will increase when the legitimacy of the ARP is challenged by 
stakeholders. 
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The Influence of State-Level Sociopolitical Contexts on Target Organizations  
In addition to local SMOs, I also examine whether the sociopolitical climate at the state level, a 
critical condition for local SMOs’ success, shifted in favor of SMOs, particularly those targeting 
SO2 emissions when the federal policy was challenged. As previously mentioned, between 2010 
and 2011, key stakeholders questioned the value of an allowance as a means for protecting the 
rights to produce SO2. Furthermore, the EPA’s failures to amend the policy created operational 
uncertainties for coal-fired facilities. Drawing from an institutional perspective, here, I argue that 
when the effectiveness of the ARP was questioned, the influence of local sociopolitical contexts 
on coal-fired facilities’ emissions increased as facilities could no longer secure operational 
stability from the federal policy. In particular, I explain why coal-fired facilities attended to their 
informal (normative and cultural-cognitive) and formal (regulatory) sociopolitical contexts at the 
state-level which are closely associated with SMOs’ effectiveness (Soule and Olzak, 2004; Sine 
and Lee, 2009).     
Zucker’s (1986) work on institutional-based trust provides some insights into the 
relationship between federal rules and state-level sociopolitical contexts. According to Zucker, 
the level of trust among community members is based on shared norms and values within a 
community. In her study, she defined trust as a set of expected outcomes during transactions 
shared by all entities engaged in exchange activities of various kinds. Using the historical context 
of financial institutions between the 19th and 20th centuries, she then introduced how the trust-
formation process shifted from locally-based informal norms and values within a community to 
institutional-based trust, where trust is constructed beyond geographical boundaries through 
formal societal structures, such as rules, codified practices, and bureaucratic agencies. From this 
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perspective, she explained that the establishment of formal societal structures (e.g., the 
enactment of a federal regulation) created a common understanding among stakeholders about a 
given situation by rationalizing cultural and normative elements across regions.  
From an environmental standpoint, state-level norms and values provide a general moral 
standard about preserving the natural environment, such as “air pollution should be reduced, as it 
harms our environment.” Studies in this vein have shown that the level of such standards varies 
across regions because people’s expectations are largely dependent on regional cultural values 
(Kamieniecki and Kraft, 2013; Lee and Lounsbury, 2015). On the other hand, federal rules and 
regulations provide a specific standard, such as “coal-fired facilities that pollute SO2 above their 
cap will be fined $2,000 per ton,” regardless of location. Therefore, when a given rule is taken 
for granted and trusted, stakeholders operating under the formalized rule are likely to expect 
similar modes of polluting behavior from the local facilities across regions. This example shows 
that when the rule-setting process is complete, diverse cultural and normative elements across 
communities are “forced into a uniform pattern” (Zucker, 1986: 99). 
Particularly in a democratic society, the legislative process entails several stages at which 
formal and informal sociopolitical actors participate and negotiate depending on their interests 
and normative expectations (Shugart et al., 2005). When a consensus is reached among 
stakeholders, the institutionalization process of a given policy creates a sense of trust and 
becomes a mutual governance structure accepted by local stakeholders and organizations across 
regions (Zucker, 1986). For example, in her study of the U.S. banking industry, Zucker (1986) 
found that, over time, traditional market transaction norms built on reputation and kinship were 
replaced by formalized mechanisms (e.g., rules and regulations) when these rules and regulations 
were able to ensure stakeholders’ transactions both within and across geographic boundaries. For 
 50 
 
organizations, the rationalization of norms decreases operational ambiguities because rules built 
on mutual expectations and trust among stakeholders define the boundaries of legitimate 
behavior and reduce the chance of misinterpreting local normative demands. As a result, 
institutional-based trust reduces the need for organizations to attend to norms and values 
associated with the situations covered by the law. 
To examine whether the influence of norms and values at the local (state) level on coal-
fired facilities was affected by trust in the efficacy of the ARP, I first examine citizens’ political 
ideology. Previous studies defined ideology as a shared mental framework that helps interpret the 
social world and identify good and proper ways of addressing social problems (Denzau and 
North 1994; Erikson and Tedin, 2003). Ideology is “a set of beliefs that are used to justify or 
challenge a given sociopolitical order and are used to interpret the political world” (Zald, 1996: 
262). From an institutional theory perspective, this definition is in line with normative and 
cognitive institutional elements, as political ideologies not only reflect a logic of appropriateness 
but also are difficult to change once established (Scott, 2013).  
With regard to environmental issues, Uyeki and Holland (2000) found that party 
identification was significantly associated with their measure of pro-environmental attitudes, 
with Democrats being more environmentally friendly. According to Feinberg and Willer (2013), 
Americans’ attitudes toward pro-environmental policy became highly polarized as pro-
environmental discourses became largely associated with moral values shared by liberals. 
Regions dominated by a politically conservative party (Republicans) emphasized economic 
growth and respect for authority, which often compete with environmental or ecological ends 
(DesJardins, 1998). Along these lines, recent studies found that organizations operating under 
Democratic local governments are more likely to invest in improving environmental 
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performance because liberals are more likely than conservatives to support the idea of 
environmental protection (Kamieniecki and Kraft, 2013; Dietz et al., 2015; Lee and Lounsbury, 
2015; Rich, 2016). These studies suggest that politically liberal regions are more likely to 
embrace pro-environmental norms and values.  
Unlike the influence of SMOs’ activities, there is no evidence that state-citizens became 
more politically liberal after the collapse of cap-and-trade mechanisms at the federal level. 
According to Brown (1988), political ideology at the state level does not change significantly 
even over time because people are often socialized to the dominant political ideology within the 
region. He noted that the stability remained despite the increase in immigration levels in the U.S. 
Similarly, using a 37-years of longitudinal data,21 Sears and Funk (1999) found that respondents 
experienced a crystallization process, which infused predispositions that strengthened initial 
political ideology over time. The stability of state political ideology was later empirically 
supported by Brace and his colleagues (2004) who used various state-level indicators. 
Considering the stability of political ideology at the state-level, it is highly unlikely that the 
failure of market mechanisms associated with the federal policy shifted citizens’ ideological 
stance at the state level.  
However, Zucker’s (1986) findings lead us to expect that when the legitimacy of a given 
national policy is challenged, the influence of state-level norms and values on organizations will 
become more important to target organizations. When the uniform pattern accepted by key 
stakeholders at the federal level is questioned, local actors would begin to look for a logic of 
appropriateness at the local level because a “stable set of [common] expectations” established at 
                                                          
21 The authors used Terman longitudinal study, which followed 1,272 respondents’ political ideology between 1940 
and 1977.   
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the federal level no longer exists (Zucker, 1986: 100). For this reason, I argue that when target 
organizations such as coal-fired facilities comply with the federal law, they will be less 
concerned about state-level influences on their activities as local stakeholders and sociopolitical 
actors accept the efficacy of a federal policy in addressing a social concern.  
Nonetheless, as the CAIR succumbed to legal challenges, decreasing the consensus 
around the ARP, it is more likely that organizations would pay attention to local- (state-) level 
sociopolitical norms and values associated with the ARP to secure their legitimacy and, hence, 
operational stability (Campbell, 2007). Therefore, I argue that facilities operating in politically 
liberal states were more likely to reduce SO2 emissions when the effectiveness of the ARP’s 
market mechanism was challenged compared to those in conservative states. 
H2. The influence of local citizens’ political ideology on coal-fired facilities’ 
environmental performance will increase when the legitimacy of the ARP is challenged 
by stakeholders.  
    
Moreover, when the validity of the ARP was challenged, local environmental regulations 
would be used to replace the influence of the federal policy as local stakeholders’ attention 
shifted from the federal policy to local environmental initiatives. Therefore, plants’ operational 
constraints from local environmental regulations would increase as the effect of federal law 
decreased. As shown in Figure 9, apart from the ARP, some state governments also adopted 
Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) to suppress additional toxic gas emissions—including 
SO2—by limiting the demand for electricity from fossil fuels. These states reduced electricity 
generation from fossil-fuel plants by mandating that a certain percentage of energy generated or 
distributed by a utility company must come from renewable sources. Otherwise, the company 
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would face a monetary penalty. In this vein, environmental scientists have suggested that the 
adoption of an RPS would be an effective state-level policy for reducing emissions of SO2 as 
well as nitrogen dioxide, carbon dioxide, and mercury (Dobesova, Apt, and Lave, 2005; Mai et 
al., 2017). In terms of implementation, states with RPSs delegated the oversight of this policy to 
their Public Utilities Commissions (PUCs), which were in charge of implementing the law: 
writing detailed rules, monitoring utilities, and punishing those that violated the law. In this 
respect, at the state level, the RPS was used not only to promote the use of renewable energy but 
also to control various pollutants produced from coal-fired facilities at the state level including 
the emissions of acid rain pollutants.   
 
Source: National Conference of State Legislatures (http://www.ncsl.org/research/energy/renewable-portfolio-
standards.aspx) 
Figure 9. States with Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS), 2011 
 
During the time the ARP was perceived as an effective regulatory mechanism (2003–
2009), an allowance represented the protected right at the federal level to emit one ton of SO2. 
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Since coal-fired facilities’ SO2 emissions were justified by allowances obtained from either the 
EPA or the market, operational activities related to SO2 emissions were mostly affected by the 
federal policy rather than local environmental regulations. As a result, the need for coal-fired 
facilities to attend to local regulatory standards associated with SO2 was reduced when local 
stakeholders accepted the validity of the federal regulation. In fact, some studies examining the 
implementation of state-level RPS argued that this was largely a symbolic and toothless policy 
during this period (Vasseur, 2014; Cordero and Sine, 2017). 
However, when the ARP faced challenges (2010–2011), I argue that coal-fired facilities 
would begin to attend more closely to state-level regulations as local stakeholders’ attention 
shifted from the federal policy to local environmental initiatives. This is because local 
environmental regulations would start to cover local facilities’ SO2 emissions and uphold the 
goals of the questionable policy. As shown in Figure 10, state governments started to implement 
higher renewable energy standards during this period. Although the initial adoption of the RPS 
was to promote the use of renewable energy rather than to diminish acid rain pollutants, these 
states advertised the effectiveness of state-level renewable policies with respect to reduction in 
SO2 emissions when the ARP was being challenged. For example, States, such as Illinois, 
celebrated their success in reducing SO2 by implementing the RPS (Progress Illinois, 2013). 
Similarly, the state of Oregon announced that the State would adopt the RPS in 2007 to reduce 
the states’ dependency on coal for cutting toxic materials. In 2016, the state set a new goal to 
generate at least 50 percent of its energy from renewable sources by 2040 in order to decrease 
emissions of greenhouse gases and acid rain pollutants22. In this vein, the National Renewable 
Energy Laboratory and the Berkeley Lab reported that the application of state-level RPSs 
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reduced 77,400 tons of SO2 emissions in 2013 at the federal level to promote the effectiveness of 
the RPS (Wiser et al., 2016).     
 
Source: National Conference of State Legislatures, 2000-2012 
Figure 10. Renewable Energy Generation for RPS Compliance  
 
Moreover, key stakeholders reduced their dependency on the crippled federal policy and 
attempted to seek local environmental initiatives. For example, in 2011 Washington governor 
Chris Gregoire signed legislation to phase out energy production from coal by mandating that 
local coal-fired facilities install additional air pollution control technology (Environmental News 
Service, 201123). In a similar vein, in 2014 the Indiana Department of Environmental 
Management confirmed that it would implement more stringent rules at the state level to lower 
the level of SO2 emissions (Indiana Department of Environmental Management, 2014). In other 
                                                          
23 In 2016, the state of Oregon passed the Clean Electricity and Coal Transition Plan (SB 1547-B)” 
http://envirolaws.org/bill-file/the-clean-electricity-and-coal- transition-plan 
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words, these states took advantage of local environmental regulations to control SO2 and other 
acid rain pollutants.  
Together, these examples show how states with pro-environmental initiatives not only 
maintained but increased their bid to reduce SO2 emissions even when the federal ARP was 
being challenged (Vasseur, 2014; Dietz et al., 2015). From this perspective, I argue that when an 
environmental policy at the federal level is perceived as effective, firms will focus on their 
compliance strategies associated with the federal law. However, when the validity of the federal 
law is being challenged, I hypothesize  
H3. The influence of state-level pro-environmental regulations (e.g., RPS) on coal-fired 
facilities’ environmental performance will increase when the legitimacy of the ARP is 
challenged by stakeholders.  
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CHAPTER 4.  
METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
4.1 Data  
To test my hypotheses, I gathered data from the clean air market database24 (CAMD), which 
provides various types of operational information at both the facility (plant) and the unit 
(chimney) level. A facility consists of one or more units that generate acid rain pollutants. Since 
units are mostly operated, controlled, and monitored at the facility level, my unit of analysis in 
this study is the facility. Moreover, the EPA requested electricity generating units for compliance 
at the facility level to provide more operational flexibility and collected the allowance 
information at the facility level (EPA 40 CFR Parts 51, et al., 2004).25 Assuming that each unit 
had certain rights over the allocation of allowances and other operational decisions at the facility 
level, I argue that analyzing at the facility level meets my research objectives.    
For greater simplicity in the analysis, I limited my sample to plants that generated more 
than 50 percent of their electricity from burning coal. The study period is from 2003 to 2011 
because the EPA not only recorded ownership data but also introduced a nitrogen dioxide control 
regulation under the ARP beginning in 2003. I end my analysis in 2011, when the Obama 
administration finalized a new rule (the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule; CSAPR) to replace the 
CAIR. Under the new rule, the EPA considered seasonal variations and additional pollutants. 
Although CSAPR was vacated in 2012,26 I end my analysis with 2011 because the 
announcement signaled potential changes to coal-fired facilities and market participants. In the 
United States, all facilities under the ARP had to measure and report their emissions to the EPA 
                                                          
24 The data can be obtained from the EPA website (http://ampd.epa.gov/ampd). 
 
25 40 CFR Parts 51, et al. Supplemental Proposal for the Rule to Reduce Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate 
Matter and Ozone (Clean Air Interstate Rule); Proposed Rule, Environmental Protection Agency (2004). 
26 The CSAPR was challenged in court by 27 states; and in August 2012, the D.C. Circuit invalidated the rule.  
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by using either a continuous emission monitoring system (CEMS) or other approved methods. 
Over this period, the data cover coal-fired facilities’ basic information, SO2 emissions, SO2 
allowances trading information, program compliance, auction results, and so forth. Based on this 
information, the EPA allows researchers to collect data from the unit level up to the state level.  
In addition to using the CAMD, I collected data from sources such as the U.S. Energy 
Department, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), the Database of State Incentives for 
Renewable Energy (DSIRE), and the Sierra Club. I then integrated these data into a unique 
dataset that allows us to examine how state-level characteristics affected coal-fired facilities’ 
environmental performance. Overall, there are 3,604 observations across 43 states during my 
study period. Some states, such as Alaska, California, Hawaii, Maine, Rhode Island, Idaho, and 
Vermont, as well as the District of Columbia, were omitted from the sample because they have 
no facilities that primarily generate electricity from coal. These exclusions should not affect my 
analyses, as these states are either strongly pro-environmental (e.g., California and Vermont) or 
relatively small in terms of energy consumption and population compared with average states 
(e.g., District of Columbia and Alaska). The combined datasets provide a rich context for testing 
my hypotheses on how societal-level and regional factors influence organizations in a more 
dynamic way.  
 
4.2 Variables  
Dependent Variables  
To construct a measure of environmental performance across facilities, I used the total amount of 
SO2 (in tons) emitted annually by each facility divided by its total number of units, “chimneys” 
(ton/unit). Previous studies used other measures such as emission tons per heat input (BTU), or 
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emissions per unit of electricity generated (MWh), to capture the emissions of units 
(“chimneys”) within a facility (Ellerman and Montero, 2007; AlRafea et al., 2016). However, 
these studies assumed that each unit was independent enough to determine its own operational 
decisions. In reality, operational decisions, such as the use of allowances, were made at the 
facility level based on contracts between unit owners, because during the study period, the EPA 
monitored the use of allowances at the facility level not only to minimize monitoring costs but 
also to give facilities operational flexibility (EPA 40 CFR Parts 51, et al., 2004). As a result, 
large facilities with multiple units optimized their use of allowances by generating electricity 
from certain units with high efficiency while minimizing the use of inefficient units and using 
the allowances from the latter to operate the former (Burtraw et al., 2005). Since facilities with 
more units had more operational choices for handling SO2 emissions (Ellerman, 2000; Burtraw et 
al., 2005), in this paper I used emission tons per unit to compare emissions across facilities (Zhao 
et al., 2008; Jaber et al., 2013; Zhang et al., 2017).  
After adjusting for the effect of other operational variables such as operating time, heat 
inputs, reserved allowances, and prior level of emissions at the plant level, my dependent 
variable provides an objective measure of a facility’s environmental performance. My measure is 
consistent with that used by previous studies. For example, Lee and Lounsbury (2015) measured 
the total amount of chemical waste generated by each facility under the TRI as a proxy for 
organizations’ attempt to improve their environmental performance. The reduction in emissions 
directly captures how facilities explicitly responded to the ARP and local (state) sociopolitical 
contextual factors. 
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Independent Variables 
To test my hypotheses, I used lagged explanatory variables (t-1) in an effort to eliminate the 
correlation between the independent variables and the error term (Baccini and Urpelainen, 2014; 
Lehoucq and Perez-Linan, 2014; Steinberg and Malhotra, 2014). From an organizational study 
perspective, this approach is based on the assumption that an organization’s response to the 
regional context would not be immediate but gradual due to its structural inertia (Hannan and 
Freeman, 1984). 
First, I used Sierra Club membership (in thousands) as a proxy for the effect of state-level 
SMOs on facilities’ environmental performance. I obtained membership data at the state level 
from the Sierra Club. Here, I argue that state-level membership represents local normative 
expectations related to environmental issues because the Sierra Club is one of the three largest 
environmental movement organizations in the United States (McCloskey, 1992). According to 
Sine and Lee (2009: 139), membership “reflects the size and strength of the Sierra Club more 
accurately than other measures such as the number of Sierra Club chapters in a state” and is also 
highly correlated with the number of SMOs in a given state. 
I captured local citizens’ liberal political ideology using a measure developed by Berry 
and his colleagues (1998, 2010).  The authors constructed citizens’ political ideology in two 
steps. First, they created an ADA/COPE measure as a proxy for the political ideology of a given 
state government, based on a survey by interest groups (Americans for Democratic Action and 
Committee on Political Education). Using the ADA/COPE score as a baseline measure, they 
weighted citizens’ political ideology by citizens’ voting behavior and by roll-call votes by 
members of Congress. According to the authors, the measure is strongly correlated with 
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Stimson’s (1991, 2004) measure of political mood in a given state (Berry et al., 2010). The 
variable is continuous (0–100). The higher the score, the more politically liberal a given state’s 
citizens are.  
As a robustness test, I also used a variable from the League of Conservation Voters 
(LCV), which tracks the voting records of all members of Congress with respect to 
environmental legislation. The LCV score is the nationally accepted measure for rating members 
of Congress on environmental, public health, and energy issues (Shipan and Lowry, 2001; 
Dunlap and McCright 2008). Moreover, assuming that local politicians reflect local political 
demands, studies of citizens’ political ideology use lawmakers’ voting behavior as a valid 
measure (Berry et al, 1998, 2010; Nelson, 2002). Each year the league’s committee members 
consisting of 20 respected environmental and conservation organizations, select the most 
important votes on environmental issues and calculate whether each state’s Senate and House 
members took a pro-environmental position or not by dividing the number of pro-environment 
votes cast by the total number of votes scored. The LCV scores range from 0 to 200, with 0 
indicating no support for the environment and 200 indicating full support from Congress 
members in a given state (both House and Senate members). Assuming that LCV scores reflect 
another aspect of political ideology associated with pro-environmentalism at the state level, I 
also examined whether facilities operating in states where lawmakers politically engage in issues 
related to pro-environmentalism faced stronger local pressures to reduce emissions when the 
federal policy was challenged.  
Finally, to test my third hypothesis, I used a binary variable coded 1 if a given state 
implemented the RPS as a mandatory requirement. This information was obtained from the 
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory. I used the first year the RPS was implemented rather 
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than the year the law was passed to capture the actual influence of state-level regulations. As 
noted, state governments took advantage of the RPS to suppress coal-fired facilities’ operations 
through legal sanctions and price competition with renewable sources (Lyon and Yin, 2010; 
Vasseur, 2014). After the implementation, the variable is coded 1 to indicate whether facilities 
operating in states with the RPS encountered formal sociopolitical pressures at the state level to 
reduce emissions. States that had implemented the RPS before 2003 (e.g., Iowa, Arizona, 
Wisconsin) were coded as 1 throughout the entire study period. As of 2011, 29 states and the 
District of Columbia had adopted the RPS (shown in Figure 9). This variable indicates how 
facilities’ responses to state-level environmental regulations such as the RPS changed when the 
perceived effectiveness of the ARP was challenged (2010–2011). 
 
Control Variables 
As noted from my hypotheses, this study requires a multilevel approach. I controlled for both 
organizational and state-level characteristics that might affect the relationship between my 
dependent variable (SO2 emissions) and independent variables. First, I controlled for facility 
characteristics that are closely related to facilities’ SO2 emissions in a given year t. All variables 
at the facility level are from the CAMD. In line with my dependent variable, I used the average 
of unit-level information to construct variables at the facility level. This allowed us to adjust the 
effect of unit capacity in a given facility. For this reason, in my analysis I did not control for the 
number of units installed in each facility.  
To begin, I created a dummy variable indicating the past polluting behavior of a given 
facility. Based on the total distribution of pollution at time t-1, I created five categories of 
polluters: top 20 percent polluters, moderately high polluters (20–40 percent), moderate polluters 
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(40–60 percent), low polluters (60–80 percent), and lowest polluters (<20 percent). I also 
controlled for logged operation time, or the total hours that a given facility operated in a given 
year. The size of facility is measured as heat input (MMBtu). This measure is the amount of fuel 
consumed for producing electricity weighted by the heat generated from the source of energy. I 
adopted this variable as an indicator of facility size because it is widely used by economists and 
environmental science journals. Moreover, the measure is highly correlated with the amount of 
electricity generated by a given unit (0.989). This means that a facility with high heat input and 
low operating time represents a high level of operational efficiency. I also controlled for the 
average age of units in a facility. Because one way to reduce emissions is to install filters 
(scrubbers) on each unit, I controlled for each facility’s installation rate of filters (number of 
units with filters/ Ʃ number of units). Although the CEMS continuously records a facility’s 
operations, the ARP also allowed facilities to voluntarily report their operational information to 
the EPA. If a facility reported its operational information every single month in a given year, I 
viewed this as the facility’s effort to comply with environmental regulations.  
Under the ARP, plants’ emissions of nitrogen oxide (NOx), another source of acid rain, 
were regulated through an emission rate limit. Similar to a traditional regulatory approach 
(command-and-control), plants affected by the NOx aspect of the ARP were to demonstrate that 
they complied with the NOx provisions at the end of the year. That is, each year facilities were 
required to provide evidence to the EPA that the level of their NOx emissions was below the 
standard. To adjust the effect of other regulatory characteristics of the ARP that did not involve 
any market characteristics (e.g. NOx emissions), I controlled for the average amount of NOx 
produced by units in a facility in year t.  
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To examine whether reserved allowances in the prior year (t-1) affected facilities’ 
emissions in year t, I considered how much each facility reserved its allowances (ton/unit) in 
year t-1 for future usages. I also controlled for the average amount of money (in dollars) that the 
facilities gained each year from the public auction. To supply the auctions with allowances, the 
EPA held an Auction Allowance Reserve of approximately 2.8 percent of the total annual 
allowances allocated to all units in March of each year. The purpose of the allowance auction 
was to inform the market value of an allowance in a given year t for all market participants, 
including coal-fired facilities. Therefore, the measure is an indicator of monetary value combined 
with allowances that were initially allocated by the EPA. Because facilities’ data were updated at 
the end of the year, I controlled for the dollar value of allowances each facility gained in year t 
rather than year t-1, as operational decisions in year t were mostly affected by the auction result 
in year t.  
In addition, because some facilities were able to transfer their operational assets, such as 
allowances and raw materials, to other facilities for various reasons, I controlled for the total 
number of facilities that were connected to a focal facility through ownership. Higher 
connectedness implies that a facility had more channels for either sending or receiving 
operational assets, including allowances, at a lower transaction cost. To control for ownership 
structure, I included whether a facility was owned by a single entity or not (dummy coded), as a 
complex ownership structure could affect operational decision-making processes (Lee and 
O’Neill, 2003). Because some facilities were operated by multiple operators, I also controlled for 
the total number of operators associated with a focal facility, assuming that facilities operated by 
a single operator were more likely to respond promptly to environmental changes.  
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State-level control variables were lagged to adjust the effect of my independent variables 
on SO2 emissions. The general state-level characteristics were obtained from the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics. At the state level, I considered two aspects of size, controlling for land area (in 
square miles) and total population (in millions). In addition, I controlled for the unemployment 
rate and gross state product (GSP; measured in millions of U.S. dollars) to reflect a state’s 
economic conditions because more affluent states either may require more coal-fired facilities or 
may have powerful citizens who might suppress coal-fired power plants’ operations (Lyon and 
Yin, 2010).  
Obtaining data from the EIA and the EPA, I additionally controlled for energy-market 
and air-quality factors that could potentially affect plant operations. Since states’ pollution levels 
could influence local governments or citizens to oppose coal-fired facilities’ operations (Sine and 
Lee, 2009), I controlled for state air pollution in year t-1. To measure the air quality of a given 
state, EPA collected data from its monitoring locations and created an Air Quality Index (AQI). 
Using the index, the measure counts the average number (in hundreds) of violations a given state 
made every day by exceeding the EPA’s compliance level suggested in the National Air Quality 
Standards.27  
In a similar vein, I controlled for the total number of facilities in a given state, as higher 
density increases not only the level of pollution but also the visibility of coal-fired facilities to 
local stakeholders and SMOs. Assuming that coal-fired facilities not only faced competition 
from electricity providers of natural gas but also had the opportunity to switch their fuels from 
coal to natural gas, I controlled for the price of natural gas and coal in the electric power sector 
of a given state (million dollars per BTU). I controlled for the total amount of electricity 
                                                          
27 The EPA tracked various pollutants such as SO2, nitrogen dioxide, ozone, and carbon monoxide from its 
monitoring locations in a given state. My measure is the number of violations identified by the EPA.  
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produced from natural gas (GWh) in a given state, as coal-fired facilities competed with plants 
producing electricity from natural gas. I also controlled for electricity price (wholesale price) in 
tens of U.S. dollars per billion BTUs in year t-1. Assuming that facilities operating in states with 
easy access to low-sulfur coal have higher incentives to reduce SO2 emissions by switching their 
fuels at a lower cost (e.g., transportation cost), I controlled for states that produce low-sulfur coal 
because some scholars suggest that the additional drop in SO2 emissions comes from the wide 
use of low-sulfur coal (Schmalensee and Stavins, 2013).  
Last, I controlled for the 28 states (as shown in Figure 1 in the previous chapter) under 
the influence of the CAIR program between 2010 and 2011. As noted, facilities operating in 
these states faced operational constraints in addition to the ARP, as the CAIR mandated that 
these facilities further reduce SO2 and NOx emissions. In my analysis, I examined whether 
implementation of the CAIR, a legally crippled rule which threatened the perceived effectiveness 
of the market-based policy, had a significant impact on coal plants’ SO2 emissions. In Table 2, I 
summarize variables included in the analysis.   
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Table 2. Variables Descriptive  
  Variable 
Level 
Time Description 
1 SO2 (tons) 
Facilty 
t average unit emissions (ton /unit) 
2 L1.pollution category t-1 
past emissions category (1:Bottom 20 % ~ 5: Top 20 % 
Polluters) 
3 NoX (tons) t average unit emissions of Nitrogen Dioxide  
4 Heat input (mmBTU) t 
The amount of fuel consumed for producing electricity 
weighted 
by the heat generated from the source of energy (MMBTU) 
5 Facility age t average unit age (years) 
6 Logged operating time t average unit operating hours  
7 L1. banked allowances t-1 
allowances preserved in year t-1 which can be used in year t 
by the focal facility 
8 Auction ($) t money gained from the auction in March 
9 SO2 controls (ratio) t # units with filters/ total # of units  
10 Voluntary report (binary) t 
whether a gvien facility voluntarily reported their emissions  
to the EPA every month  
11 # connected facilities t # of facilities connected through ownership 
12 Single owner (binary) t facility owned by a single owner  
13 Land area (square miles) 
State 
time 
invariant 
state size 
14 
L1. total population 
(millions) 
t-1 state population  
15 L1.GSP (state)  t-1 state GDP 
16 L1.unemployment t-1 unemployment rate 
17 
L1.natural gas 
price($MBtU)  
t-1 natural gas price in a given state 
18 L1.elec. natural gas (GWh) t-1 electricity produced from natural gas 
19 L1.coal price($MBtU)  t-1 average price of coal in a given state 
20 L1. elec. price ($) t-1 average electricity price in a given state 
21 
L1.air quality (in 
hundreads) 
t-1 
the average number (in hundreds) of daily violations a given  
state made by exceeding the EPA's compliance level. (when 
the number of any of all air pollutants identified by the EPA. 
22 # facilities (state) t-1 the total number of facilities in a given state in year t-1 
23 Low sulfur coal (state) 
time 
invariant 
states that produce low sulfur coal  
24 CAIR states 2010-2011 states affected by the CAIR during 2010 and 2011 
25 L1. S. Club membership  t-1 membership in thousands 
26 L1. Citizen’s ideology t-1 
Berry's measure of political ideology. Surveyed by interest 
groups 
27 L1.RPS t-1 whether a given state has implemented the RPS in time t-1 
28 L1. LCV Score t-1 
% of votes related to proenvironmental policies 
(House+Senate)  
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CHAPTER 5.  
ANALYSIS & RESULTS 
5.1 Analysis 
As noted, my hypotheses tested how the influence of state-level sociopolitical context on 
emissions changed over time, in particular before and after 2009, the year when the removal of 
the CAIR from the ARP was finally enacted. Using an integrated and multilevel theory that 
considers the contingent and interactive effects of institutional characteristics at the state level 
(Soule and Olzak, 2004; Schneiberg and Lounsbury, 2008), I expected to find that regional 
norms that buttress pro-environmentalism have a significant impact on coal-fired power plants’ 
SO2 emissions. To test my hypotheses in this study, I used a two-level random-coefficient model 
with maximum likelihood methods. The multilevel models allowed us to investigate the effect of 
regional contexts while adjusting the effect of variables at the facility level. My models 
estimated ﬁxed-effect regression coefﬁcients at the facility level with random intercept terms at 
higher levels. The assumption is that between-unit variables at each level are higher than those 
observed within units (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2008). According to Lee and Lounsbury 
(2015: 858), “mixed-effect analyses model the between-unit variability as a random intercept and 
estimate ﬁxed-effect coefﬁcients while taking the between-unit heterogeneity into account.” 
Another advantage of using hierarchical linear models is that doing so allows researchers to 
examine time-invariant variables such as land area or states with low-sulfur coal.  
Additionally, I used random slope of time for each facility and state, assuming that 
facilities and states responded differently to the regulatory environment over time. While the 
linear regression model assumes that all individual facilities and states come from a population 
with a single slope, the random-coefficient model relaxes this assumption by allowing the slope 
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to vary across my observations and to be predicted by other covariates (Hildreth and Houck, 
1968; Johnston, 1984; Singer and Willet, 2003; Swamy, 2012). By allowing for a random slope 
of time for each facility and state, I allow the effect of time (i.e., the slope) on my dependent 
variable to vary freely across facilities and states, which is more realistic in the case of the ARP. 
Furthermore, I used a time-trend variable to adjust the effect of technological developments and 
the increase of stakeholder demands associated with emission reduction during my study period. 
I then used facility fixed-effects models to examine whether my results are consistent.  
Last, to confirm the temporally discontinuous effects of key variables (Sierra Club 
members, citizen ideology and RPS) related to the vacating of the CAIR, I conducted two 
robustness checks. First, in my analysis, I interacted the year measure (time trend) with my 
independent variables to adjust the effect of change over time. Second, as previously noted, I 
initially argued that the legitimate cut-point is the year 2009, because in 2010 not only did the 
Obama administration decide to drop the CAIR from the ARP but also the price of an allowance 
fell below that of operating scrubbers. As a robustness test, I ran additional models by using a 
different cut-point, for instance in 2006, when the price of an allowance dropped significantly 
(but was still above the operating cost of filters) as a result of lawsuits by various stakeholders. 
 
5.2 Results 
As shown in the previous chapter, between 2003 and 2011, facilities maintained a reduction in 
their emissions even after the legitimacy of the ARP was largely challenged. The SO2 emissions 
per unit declined steadily during our study period even after 2009. Table 3 presents the means 
and standard deviations for all study variables. Table 4 presents the intercorrelations between our 
key variables and controls. The correlation between Sierra Club membership and citizens’ 
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political ideology is 0.469. Admittedly, these variables may be conceptually highly correlated 
because environmental movement organizations may easily mobilize participants in politically 
liberal states (Dunlap et al., 2001). However, the correlations between these variables are not 
high enough to raise concerns about multicollinearity. Similarly, states that have strong 
environmental movements and that are politically liberal are more likely to implement RPSs; the 
correlations between these variables are 0.391 and 0.364, respectively. The positive correlation 
between monetary gains from the allowance auction and SO2 emissions (0.492) comes from the 
number of allowances that each facility received from the EPA in a given year t.  
As expected, the LCV score is highly correlated with state political ideology (0.707), as 
lawmakers in states with politically liberal citizens are pressured to support pro-environmental 
policies (Shipan and Lowry, 2001). However, the correlation between LCV score and the 
implementation of the RPS is relatively low (0.327). In this respect, LCV scores may reflect the 
normative or cultural-cognitive dimension of the state-level sociopolitical environment better 
than they reflect the regulatory environment.  
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics 
  Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev 
1 SO2 (tons) 3604 7540.71 8998.99 
2 L1.pollution category 3604 2.91 1.39 
3 NoX (tons) 3604 2927.23 2957.87 
4 Heat input (mmBTU) 3604 20600000 18000000 
5 Facility age 3604 37.67 12.57 
6 Logged operating time 3604 8.79 0.49 
7 L1. banked allowances 3604 7051.58 14057.9 
8 Auction ($) 3604 632.78 1009.92 
9 SO2 controls (ratio) 3604 0.33 0.45 
10 Voluntary report (binary) 3604 0.99 0.09 
11 # connected facilities 3604 6.35 5.63 
12 Single owner (binary) 3604 0.78 0.41 
13 Land area (square miles) 3604 63892.59 49145.39 
14 L1. total population (millions) 3604 7.69 5.56 
15 L1.GSP (state)  3604 297154.6 254526.3 
16 L1.unemployment 3604 6.01 2.02 
17 L1.natural gas price($MBtU)  3604 6.48 1.96 
18 L1.elec. natural gas (GWh) 3604 18809.5 41491.5 
19 L1.coal price($MBtU)  3604 1.71 0.67 
20 L1. elec. price ($) 3604 22.56 5.95 
21 L1.air quality 3604 3.39 5.34 
22 # facilities 3604 14.23 6.13 
23 Low sulfur coal (state) 3604 0.13 0.34 
24 CAIR states 3604 0.17 0.38 
25 
L1. S. Club membership  
(in thousands) 
3604 13.74 9.73 
26 L1. Citizen’s ideology 3604 50.92 12.06 
27 L1.RPS 3604 0.42 0.49 
28 L1. LCV Score 3604 85.01 48.41 
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Table 4. Correlation Table 
  Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 SO2 (tons) 1              
2 L1.pollution category 0.728 1             
3 NoX (tons) 0.484 0.474 1            
4 Heat input (mmBTU) 0.502 0.502 0.766 1           
5 Facility age -0.134 -0.111 -0.395 -0.537 1          
6 Logged operating time 0.197 0.235 0.271 0.32 -0.279 1         
7 L1. banked allowances 0.016 0.072 0.043 0.242 -0.038 0.032 1        
8 Auction ($) 0.492 0.433 0.431 0.434 -0.134 0.158 -0.069 1       
9 SO2 controls (ratio) -0.21 -0.243 0.183 0.309 -0.479 0.123 0.106 -0.043 1      
10 Voluntary report (binary) 0.048 0.045 0.054 0.031 0.03 0.135 0.001 0.037 -0.037 1     
11 # connected facilities 0.167 0.121 0.225 0.259 0.039 0.018 0.055 0.172 0.096 -0.003 1    
12 Single owner (binary) -0.162 -0.167 -0.342 -0.361 0.287 -0.094 -0.088 -0.145 -0.15 -0.001 -0.481 1   
13 Land area (square miles) 0.006 0.015 0.106 0.257 -0.319 0.137 0.113 0.036 0.174 -0.011 -0.065 -0.097 1  
14 L1. total population 0.105 0.113 -0.076 0.095 -0.005 -0.018 0.116 0.078 0.036 -0.036 -0.088 0.071 0.455 1 
15 L1.GSP  0.13 0.129 0.021 0.177 -0.103 0.038 0.151 0.098 0.141 -0.006 -0.024 0.005 0.535 0.732 
16 L1.unemployment -0.114 -0.117 -0.197 -0.048 0.118 -0.128 0.284 -0.261 0.088 -0.043 0.007 0.063 -0.041 0.131 
17 L1.natural gas price($MBtU)  -0.003 0.031 -0.103 -0.06 0.102 -0.079 -0.042 0.185 -0.022 -0.01 0.026 0.022 -0.125 0.027 
18 L1.elec. natural gas (MnKWh) 0.084 0.133 0.053 0.251 -0.247 0.066 0.197 0.072 0.14 -0.02 -0.16 -0.029 0.798 0.738 
18 L1.coal price($MBtU)  -0.098 -0.103 -0.222 -0.086 0.17 -0.148 0.155 -0.15 0.041 -0.043 -0.111 0.043 0.052 0.508 
19 L1. elec. price ($) -0.058 -0.017 -0.152 -0.047 0.066 -0.097 0.239 -0.165 0.055 -0.012 -0.074 0.039 -0.135 -0.015 
21 L1.air quality 0.137 0.092 0.064 0.032 0.084 -0.018 -0.106 0.127 -0.095 0.013 0.002 0.092 -0.223 -0.148 
22 # facilities 0.087 0.049 -0.17 -0.082 0.148 -0.05 -0.065 0.012 -0.08 -0.023 0.009 0.142 0.014 0.402 
23 Low sulfur coal (state) -0.041 -0.078 0.013 0.012 -0.06 0.006 -0.041 -0.009 0.208 -0.002 0.066 0.037 -0.047 -0.316 
24 CAIR states -0.122 -0.124 -0.196 -0.037 0.143 -0.166 0.344 -0.285 0.087 -0.06 0.033 0.025 -0.044 0.127 
25 L1. S. Club membership 0.022 -0.029 -0.125 -0.06 0.105 -0.04 -0.043 0.053 -0.013 -0.025 -0.062 0.083 0.149 0.811 
26 L1. Citizen’s ideology -0.034 -0.076 -0.175 -0.147 0.253 -0.141 -0.112 -0.007 -0.078 -0.023 -0.034 0.097 -0.228 0.214 
27 L1.RPS -0.088 -0.179 -0.171 -0.055 0.094 -0.08 0.027 -0.157 0.025 -0.047 -0.025 -0.03 0.299 0.258 
28 L1. LCV Score -0.108 -0.145 -0.154 -0.148 0.204 -0.131 -0.03 -0.138 -0.065 -0.012 -0.081 0.068 -0.29 0.029 
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Table 4 (continued) 
  Variable 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 
 
15 L1.GSP  1               
16 L1.unemployment 0.131 1              
17 L1.natural gas price($MBtU)  0.027 -0.339 1             
18 L1.elec. natural gas (MnKWh) 0.698 0.053 -0.045 1            
18 L1.coal price($MBtU)  0.286 0.263 0.137 0.338 1           
19 L1. elec. price ($) 0.161 0.327 0.145 0.054 0.312 1          
21 L1.air quality -0.081 -0.093 0.021 -0.18 -0.285 -0.075 1         
22 # facilities 0.295 0.205 0.037 0.058 -0.163 -0.159 0.255 1        
23 Low sulfur coal (state) -0.196 -0.003 -0.032 -0.148 -0.33 -0.144 0.253 0.071 1       
24 CAIR states 0.118 0.767 -0.336 0.086 0.317 0.43 -0.115 0.114 -0.037 1      
25 L1. S. Club membership 0.481 0.066 0.067 0.368 0.557 -0.127 -0.177 0.304 -0.268 -0.024 1     
26 L1. Citizen’s ideology 0.147 -0.046 0.331 -0.082 0.466 0.06 0.234 0.123 -0.143 -0.045 0.469 1    
27 L1.RPS 0.222 0.117 0.066 0.224 0.488 -0.022 -0.152 0.087 -0.193 0.169 0.391 0.364 1   
28 L1. LCV Score 0.114 0.101 0.053 -0.165 0.393 0.19 0.174 -0.023 -0.101 0.144 0.707 0.327 0.283 1 
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Table 5 presents the results of our hierarchical linear models with random slope of time 
examining the effects of state-level characteristics on SO2 emissions per unit. Model 1 is the 
baseline model, which contains all facility- and state-level variables for the whole study period 
(2003–2011). At the state level, apart from the influence of Sierra Club membership, the baseline 
model shows that the association between facilities’ SO2 emissions and the main effects of 
variables measuring state-level sociopolitical contexts are statistically insignificant throughout 
our study period (all else being equal). Whereas facilities operating in highly populated states 
increased their emissions, those operating in states with higher levels of electricity generation 
from natural gas were more likely to reduce their emissions.  
At the facility level, as expected, larger and dirtier facilities (facilities operating longer or 
having high levels of NOx emissions) generated more pollutants. However, the auction variable 
indicates that facilities that gained more financial assets from the public auction were more likely 
to produce emissions. This is because the variable captured the effect of initial allocation of 
allowances from the EPA based on historical data rather than the effect of monetary incentives. 
Since larger and dirtier facilities received larger amount of allowances from the EPA, those 
facilities with a greater initial allocation were more likely to produce SO2. Nonetheless, the total 
amount of reserved allowances in year t-1 which also partly captures the potential value of an 
allowance was not significantly associated with SO2 emissions.  
Facilities with a higher rate of filter installation, all else being equal, decreased their 
emission levels. As intended by the ARP, older facilities reduced their emission levels as a result 
of additional operating costs arising from low efficiencies and managing allowances (Chan et al., 
2012). The ownership variable indicates that facilities with more sibling plants or facilities with a 
single  
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Table 5. Hierarchical Mixed-Effect Analysis: Dependent Variable (DV): SO2 Emissions 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Time (2003–2011) 7.972 11.30 -16.13 -4.041 -304.3 -316.7 -99.74 -156.1 -6.568 -32.74    
 (84.33) (83.95) (105.04) (105.45) (160.87) (163.50) (103.76) (106.79) (86.88) (89.62)    
           
Post 2009 -604.6 -240.5 -217.8 -346.6 1022.5 1393.8 178.3 479.9 -188.2 -49.84    
 (490.49) (489.75) (492.87) (509.62) (841.24) (856.26) (586.49) (597.68) (508.99) (535.94)    
           
L1. S. Club membership -129.0** -152.3** -159.9** -163.8***  -141.7**  -144.0**  -151.3**  
 (44.34) (46.68) (49.68) (49.70)  (45.51)  (44.86)  (46.34)    
           
Time x L1. S.Club   2.269 1.582       
   (5.18) (5.25)       
           
Post2009 x L1. S.Club (H1)  -38.51* -40.23* -38.02*       
  (18.34) (18.74) (18.80)       
           
L1. Citizen’s ideology -13.01   -11.29 -33.87* -29.96    -10.97    
 (10.30)   (10.37) (16.41) (16.54)    (10.34)    
           
Time x Citizen’s ideology     7.081* 6.128*     
     (2.92) (2.99)     
           
Post2009 x C. Ideology (H2)     -32.03* -37.36**                    
     (13.23) (13.42)                    
           
L1. LCV Score       -6.048 -6.266                  
       (4.42) (4.45)                  
           
Time x LCV score        1.697* 1.700   
       (0.86) (0.88)   
           
Post2009 x LCV score (H2')       -7.711* -8.886**   
       (3.13) (3.18)   
           
L1. RPS 347.6   335.7  261.7  265.2 -361.5 -109.1    
 (245.29)   (248.10)  (248.77)  (249.17) (440.73) (451.20)    
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Table 5 (Continued)           
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
 
Time x L1. RPS 
        153.0 124.9    
         (85.71) (87.11)    
           
Post2009 x RPS (H3)         -680.0* -863.1**  
         (317.70) (324.83)    
           
L1.pollution category 1005.5*** 1010.0*** 1011.0*** 1013.4*** 1028.3*** 1013.9*** 1027.9*** 1014.9*** 1025.9*** 1009.7*** 
 (82.70) (82.71) (82.75) (82.79) (82.51) (82.65) (82.57) (82.68) (82.68) (82.71)    
           
NoX (tons) 0.445*** 0.448*** 0.447*** 0.446*** 0.451*** 0.449*** 0.446*** 0.445*** 0.452*** 0.449*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)    
           
Heat input 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
           
Facility age -108.6*** -107.7*** -107.7*** -107.5*** -107.0*** -106.5*** -107.8*** -107.5*** -109.1*** -108.2*** 
 (18.01) (18.04) (18.04) (18.04) (18.03) (18.03) (18.00) (17.99) (18.02) (18.03)    
           
Logged operating time 611.2*** 602.7*** 603.1*** 609.5*** 588.0*** 612.0*** 571.6*** 598.7*** 579.1*** 608.1*** 
 (144.83) (144.75) (144.75) (144.77) (144.84) (144.92) (144.70) (144.80) (144.71) (144.83)    
           
L1. banked allowances 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003    0.003    0.003    0.004 0.004 0.003    
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)    
           
Auction  0.701*** 0.701*** 0.702*** 0.710*** 0.672*** 0.722*** 0.663*** 0.718*** 0.664*** 0.716*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)    
           
Filter installation rate -10092*** -10101*** -10102*** -10082*** -10077*** -10081*** -10082*** -10082*** -10093*** -10100*** 
 (319.00) (319.34) (319.34) (319.29) (319.03) (318.95) (319.08) (318.93) (319.21) (319.13)    
           
Voluntary report  -320.1 -316.9 -313.0 -324.9 -340.0 -312.9 -289.3 -246.8 -312.8 -309.4    
 (538.45) (537.90) (537.94) (538.14) (538.31) (537.61) (538.45) (537.86) (538.36) (537.90)    
           
# connected facilities -65.88** -65.91** -65.77** -66.24** -63.57** -64.49** -61.70** -61.81** -64.06** -65.90**  
 (21.53) (21.53) (21.53) (21.53) (21.54) (21.53) (21.54) (21.52) (21.53) 
(21.53)   
 
 77 
 
TABLE 5 (Continued)           
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
 
Single owner  
-712.8** -763.9** -766.6** -748.1** -728.1** -747.3** -712.5** -730.0** -699.6** -728.3**  
 (256.11) (256.38) (256.43) (256.62) (255.94) (256.11) (256.44) (256.61) (256.26) (256.15)    
           
Land area (square miles) -0.009 -0.007 -0.006 -0.009 -0.003 -0.009 -0.003 -0.010 -0.004 -0.008    
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)    
           
L1. total population 632.6*** 713.3*** 706.6*** 728.3*** 404.4*** 657.9*** 392.3*** 638.6*** 430.9*** 727.5*** 
 (140.64) (148.91) (150.08) (150.73) (118.12) (144.08) (116.45) (139.97) (118.64) (147.81)    
           
L1.GSP  0.00181 0.00133 0.00124 0.00140 0.00183 0.00219 0.00172 0.00210 0.00133 0.00162    
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
           
L1.unemployment 157.2 170.4* 171.9* 162.8* 198.0* 123.6 195.0* 118.4 189.0* 120.1    
 (81.06) (81.04) (81.14) (81.39) (78.67) (82.63) (78.77) (82.61) (79.51) (82.86)    
           
L1.natural gas price -89.65 -86.21 -86.85 -87.38 -83.28 -68.25 -103.0* -87.35 -101.7* -83.95    
 (46.15) (46.13) (46.15) (46.20) (46.27) (46.72) (46.47) (46.99) (45.96) (46.25)    
           
L1.elec. natural gas  -0.051*** -0.054*** -0.054*** -0.054*** -0.046** -0.054*** -0.043** -0.050*** -0.046** -0.059*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)    
           
L1.coal price -7.047 -6.556 -9.845 -18.07 -14.35 -12.04 -11.44 -10.14 -31.39 -20.25    
 (35.29) (34.16) (34.91) (36.11) (34.23) (35.80) (34.54) (36.31) (35.78) (36.24)    
           
L1. elec. price  254.4 155.9 176.6 241.7 180.8 165.6 211.4 177.1 276.0 246.8    
 (300.98) (298.41) (302.32) (307.40) (301.52) (306.97) (295.84) (300.13) (299.41) (308.45)    
           
L1.air quality 22.07 34.16 34.07 30.35 37.71 23.05 29.37 13.72 24.31 18.13    
 (28.99) (28.98) (28.99) (29.33) (28.61) (29.11) (28.50) (28.99) (29.27) (29.48)    
           
# facilities -104.5 -120.6 -119.1 -123.0 -106.0 -113.7 -98.27 -101.5 -109.6 -122.8    
 (65.58) (67.16) (67.34) (67.23) (66.41) (66.65) (65.86) (65.69) (66.68) (67.34)    
           
Low sulfur coal (state) 3148.4* 3164.6* 3132.9* 3241.2* 2855.9* 3187.6* 2868.5* 3169.7* 2937.7* 3243.4*   
 (1288.54) (1323.47) (1329.19) (1325.88) (1295.81) (1308.19) (1285.48) (1284.01) (1299.37) (1320.41)    
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Table 5 (Continued) 
           
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
CAIR states -456.8 -199.5 -202.1 -238.6 -176.9 -111.2 -365.3 -361.6 -407.9 -388.6    
 (347.22) (363.08) (363.25) (364.03) (370.38) (373.44) (348.46) (350.52) (347.48) (348.19)    
           
Constant 1972.7 1442.2 1604.7 2207.9 2414.3 3012.5 1425.2 2287.8 1491.1 2397.0    
 (2083.68) (2056.36) (2089.79) (2121.39) (2149.07) (2171.27) (2073.69) (2106.16) (2067.85) (2099.83) 
           
# of facilities 3604 3604 3604 3604 3604 3604 3604 3604 3604 3604 
# of states 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 
Standard errors in parentheses 
†<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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owner reduced their emission levels more than others during our study period. Explaining this 
relationship requires further investigation. One explanation could be that facilities with a single 
owner or with multiple sibling plants are more sensitive to the price of an allowance; for 
instance, the former (with a single owner) might have perceived higher operational risks from 
noncompliance, as they were completely responsible for plant operation. On the other hand, the 
latter might have taken advantage of the market more actively as a result of their ample 
allowance-trading channels. However, the relationship between these variables is beyond the 
scope of this study. 
In Models 2 through 10, I added a dummy variable (post-2009) to assess how the 
influence of state-level sociopolitical contexts on SO2 emissions changed during different time 
periods (pre- and post-2009). Model 2 presents the effect of Sierra Club membership on 
emissions pre- and post-2009. In line with hypothesis 1, I found that the relationship between 
Sierra Club membership and plants’ SO2 emissions was negative after 2009. A one-standard-
deviation increase in Sierra Club membership decreased SO2 emissions by 27 percent. This 
relationship was supported even after adjusting for the effect of Sierra Club membership on 
emissions over time (Time × Sierra Club) as shown in Model 3. In other words, rather than the 
general growth trend of Sierra Club membership at the state level, the direct influence of club 
members on emissions was stronger when the ARP was legally challenged. As shown in Model 
4, this relationship was significant even after adjusting the effect of other formal and informal 
state-level sociopolitical contexts such as citizen’s political ideology and the influence of the 
RPS.  
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Model 5 presents whether the influence of state-level citizens’ political ideology on coal-
fired facilities’ environmental performance shifted after 2009. According to Model 1, which 
excluded the pre-post indicator, local citizens’ political ideology had no significant effect on 
emissions. In Model 5, however, the influence of local political ideology on emissions, as 
hypothesized (H2), increased after 2009 even after adjusting for the influence of citizens’ 
ideology over time (Time × Citizen’s ideology). I estimate that a one-standard-deviation increase 
in citizens’ political ideology reduced a facility’s emissions by 11 percent. In other words, higher 
state-level liberalism suppressed coal power plants’ emissions more strongly when the market-
based policy was perceived as ineffective. Assuming the rigidity of political ideology at the 
state-level, I suggest that coal-fired facilities become more responsive to local citizens’ demands. 
As shown in Model 6, this relationship was also significant after adjusting the effect of Sierra 
Club membership and RPSs at the state level. Similarly, as shown in Model 7 and Model 8, 
lawmakers’ voting for pro-environmental policies also had a stronger influence on the reduction 
of SO2 emissions after 2009.  
In Model 9, as hypothesized (H3), state-level regulation associated with pro-
environmentalism (RPSs) had a stronger negative impact on facilities’ emissions after 2009, 
when the ARP lost validity to the point where it could be ignored in practice. As noted, this 
relationship was supported even when citizens’ political ideology was considered in the model 
(Model 10). These results are also demonstrated in Figure 11. As shown, the negative slope is 
steeper after 2009, all else being equal. The interaction graphs show that both formal and 
informal sociopolitical contexts at the state level had a greater impact on locally operated 
organizations when the society-wide (or federal) regulatory environment was no longer 
perceived as an effective tool for organizations to secure their own legitimacy and stable 
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operations. Overall, our results show that coal-fired facilities became more responsive to local 
(state-level) sociopolitical pressures related to pro-environmentalism when the federal policy was 
perceived as ineffective.  
 
Pre-Post (2009) analysis: The influence of Sierra Club membership (state-level) on SO2 
emissions (H1). 
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Pre-Post (2009) analysis: The influence of state citizens’ political ideology on SO2 (H2). 
 
Pre-Post (2009) analysis: The influence of RPS on SO2 emissions. 
 
Figure 11. Interaction Graphs  
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I then tested the robustness of our results with the facility fixed-effects models, presented 
in Table 6. In this analysis, I dropped land area and low-sulfur-coal-producing states, as fixed-
effects models are not appropriate for examining time-invariant variables. As noted, in addition  
Table 6. Facility Fixed-Effects Models: DV: SO2 Emissions 
Variables Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 
L1. S. Club membership -185.8** -193.7** -123.3* -151.3*   
 (66.39) (66.53) (61.35) (59.41)    
 
    
Time x L1. S.Club -0.061 -1.10   
 (3.80) (4.10) 
  
 
    
Post2009 x L1. S.Club (H1) -53.42* -51.96*   
 (24.20) (24.21) 
  
     
L1. Citizen’s ideology  -29.36* -34.02* -29.65* 
  (12.29) (15.31) (12.30) 
     
Time x Citizen’s ideology   2.667  
   (2.76)   
     
Post2009 x C. Ideology (H2)   -28.56†  
   (16.94)  
     
L1. RPS  231.6 93.81 176.2 
  (256.94) (243.81) (359.08) 
     
Time x L1. RPS    35.40 
    (71.92)  
     
Post2009 x RPS (H3)    -925.5* 
    (398.25) 
     
Controls  YES YES YES YES 
     
Constant 6102.5† 7885.5* 7982.7* 8318.5*   
 (3282.17) (3364.09) (3433.73) (3416.26) 
     
# of facilities  3604 3604 3604 3604 
# of states 43 43 43 43 
Standard errors in parentheses  
†<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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to the influence of SMOs, the main effect of citizens’ political ideology was negatively 
associated with facilities’ emissions throughout our models. Importantly, the results of the fixed-
effects models are consistent with those of the two-level random-coefficient model; specifically,  
the influence of formal and informal sociopolitical contexts (political ideology, SMO members, 
and the implementation of RPSs) on coal-fired facilities’ SO2 emissions (Models 11–14). In 
particular, the influence of Sierra Club membership had stronger influence on coal-fired facilities 
after 2009 with or without adjusting the effect of other variables measuring state-level 
sociopolitical contexts. The results of the fixed-effects models also support the hypotheses that 
organizations are likely to respond to their local sociopolitical contexts when a federal policy is 
regarded as ineffective.  
Last, it is important to confirm that our measure of “perceived ineffectiveness (post-
2009)” is accurate. As noted, I define perceived ineffectiveness as occurring when key premises 
of the federal ARP policy are questioned by stakeholders. As previously mentioned in Chapter 2, 
when the court initially vacated the CAIR, stakeholders and government officials believed that 
the EPA would appeal and fix the questionable policy. However, Obama administration dropped 
the CAIR from the ARP in 2010, and stakeholders started to question the continuous use of 
market mechanisms at the federal level. As previously mentioned, stakeholders and local 
governments expected that the EPA would revise concerns raised by the Court and maintain the 
CAIR. When the CAIR was finally decided to drop out from the ARP, a number of politicians 
and public media publicized the end of cap and trade era. In this vein, John Broder (2010), one of 
the editors at The New York Times wrote as follows:    
……the concept [of cap and trade] is in wide disrepute, with opponents effectively branding 
it “cap and tax,” and Tea Party followers using it as a symbol of much of what they say is 
wrong with Washington.  
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Mr. Obama dropped all mention of cap and trade from his current budget. And the sponsors 
of a Senate climate bill likely to be introduced in April, now that Congress is moving past 
health care, dare not speak its name. 
“I don’t know what ‘cap and trade’ means,” Senator John F. Kerry, Democrat of 
Massachusetts, said last fall in introducing his original climate change plan.   
Mr. Kerry’s partner in promoting global warming legislation, Senator Lindsey Graham, 
Republican of South Carolina, pronounced economy wide cap and trade dead last month and 
has since been working with Mr. Kerry to try to patch together a bill that satisfies the diverse 
economic, regional and ideological interests of the Senate…… (New York Times, 2010 
March 25) 
 
The lack of political support was also reflected in the allowance market. The ARP was 
supposed to induce facilities to decrease emissions by restricting the supply of allowance (the 
cap component of the program) and maintaining the price of allowances above a certain level 
(higher than the cost of operating filters) via a robust market. However, in 2009 the Obama 
administration dropped the CAIR from the ARP, which led stakeholders to question the 
continuous use of market mechanisms. After a series of legal challenges to the CAIR, the price 
of an allowance became—and remained—lower than that of operating the cheapest filters after 
2009. This meant that coal-fired facilities had economic incentives to stop operating the more 
expensive filters and to increase emissions by consuming cheaper allowances. As noted, this was 
clearly contrary to the original purpose of the ARP program but was technically allowed. 
Consequently, it became clear to all parties involved that the market no longer provided a 
socially acceptable mechanism to reduce SO2 emissions.  
To further test this claim, I conducted additional pre- and post-analyses with different 
cut-off points as shown in Table 7. First, I compared the influence of our independent variables 
between period 1 (2003–2005) and period 2 (2006–2011). I chose 2005 as a cut-off point 
because the state of North Carolina first sued the EPA in 2006 (models 15–17). During this 
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period, the price of an allowance was still significantly higher than that of operating filters. In the 
second analysis, I used 2008 as a cut-off point (models 18–20) because the D.C. Circuit initially 
vacated the CAIR and asked the EPA to revise the program. Using the hierarchical mixed model  
Table 7. Hierarchical Mixed-Effect Analysis with Different Time Periods (DV: SO2 Emissions) 
Variables Post=2006–2011 Post=2008–2011 
 Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 Model 20 
L1. S. Club membership -130.8** -132.8** -138.4** -129.2** -133.0** -125.5**  
 (47.41) (45.31) (45.47) (50.12) (46.49) (46.55)  
 
       
Time x L1. S.Club 0.062    -0.63   
 (5.99) 
   (5.69)   
 
       
Post2009 x L1. S.Club (H1)  -6.283    2.525   
 (16.059) 
   (17.204)   
 
       
L1. Citizen’s ideology -10.21 -25.88 -9.666 -10.34 -25.85 -10.46    
 (10.08) (16.48) (9.99) (10.92) (16.49) (10.86)    
 
       
Time x Citizen’s ideology  0.955    5.276  
 
 (3.62)    (3.55)  
 
       
Post2009 x C. Ideology (H2)  -12.57      
 
 (14.98)      
 
       
L1. RPS 333.1 299.5 178.2 347.1 324.5 305.3    
 (249.10) (248.62) (432.52) (251.03) (248.75) (432.12)    
 
       
Time x L1. RPS 
  -32.94   -39.06    
 
  (93.14)   (94.48)    
 
       
Post2009 x RPS (H3) 
  364.6   391.2    
 
  (343.30)   (345.34) 
 
       
Controls  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
       
Constant 1956.9 2750.5 2074.5 2088.1 2909.0 2107.3 
 (2099.78) (2150.84) (2081.96) (2098.49) (2151.88) (2073.00) 
        
# of facilities 3604 3604 3604 3604 3604 3604 
# of states 43 43 43 43 43 43 
Standard errors in parentheses 
 †<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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with random coefficients of time, both analyses justify our argument that the influence of state-
level sociopolitical contexts on plants was not significant after these cut-off points but was 
significant after 2009.  
In sum, the overall pattern of our results supports our hypotheses that local (state) 
institutional characteristics will have a stronger influence on organizations when societal-level 
(federal) pressures are challenged and questioned. In particular, the additional analyses show that 
plants were likely to respond to sociopolitical contexts at the state level when the federal policy 
was perceived as ineffective. 
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CHAPTER 6.  
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Borrowing insights from the political mediation theory, I examined why targeted organizations 
might respond less to regional SMOs under certain conditions. Specifically, when the ARP was 
perceived as a valid instrument to curve SO2 emissions (2003–2009), the influence of local 
sociopolitical actors was mitigated and their direct influence on target organizations was 
absorbed by the “legitimate” federal policy. By contrast, when the federal government finally 
dropped key provisions of the ARP (2010–2011), coal-fired facilities were more likely to 
respond to local sociopolitical pressures. These results support Zucker’s (1986) insight about the 
substitutive relationship between formalized rules and normative frameworks shared by the 
members of a community. Assuming that the normative and cultural-cognitive environments 
serve as a mediation link for SMOs to exert influence on targeted organizations, the study 
extends our understanding of when and to what extent political mediation is likely to hold.  
From this perspective, my research furthers our understanding of how institutional 
stability could be achieved when institutionalized rules, norms, and beliefs at the federal level are 
constantly challenged by stakeholders in the local environment. A key insight of this study is that 
when certain institutional elements at the societal level begin to erode,28 institutional elements in 
other domains (e.g., at the local level) could replace the faltering element to prevent institutional 
decay. Despite the weakening of the ARP, organizations under this program continued to reduce 
acid rain pollutants because other institutional elements at the local level, such as local SMOs or 
citizens’ political ideology, replaced the role of the eroding federal regulation. As Oliver (1992) 
                                                          
28 Here, I assume that any type of erosion weakens the cultural-cognitive dimension. Other sources of conformity 
that once contributed to the institutionalization process could contribute to institutional maintenance by buttressing 
the cultural-cognitive dimension.   
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noted, a series of conditions must be satisfied for deinstitutionalization to take place. I argue that 
unless certain events change the common understandings and values behind a given institution at 
both societal and local levels, deinstitutionalization may not occur immediately. 
If we view institutionalization as an objectified state that increases the cost of 
nonconformity through self-reproduction mechanisms, this question will be difficult to resolve. 
However, as Zucker (1988: 26) noted, maintaining an institutionalized state requires “continuous 
action” intended to maintain the existing order. Without these efforts, “institutions would simply 
decay into cultural artifacts” (Dacin et al., 2010: 1395). Based on institutional studies of regions, 
I have endeavored to explain how an institution maintains itself against the tendency to decay by 
introducing how local institutional characteristics replace formal policies at the federal level. 
Because the processes through which institutions are maintained “remain a relatively 
understudied phenomenon” (Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006: 234), understanding these processes 
is important to expanding our knowledge of the dynamic nature of institutional elements. 
Although I relied heavily on statistical analyses and secondary documents, future studies could 
conduct more qualitative research to identify other dynamics at the global and local level. This 
requires rich historical data to track how each institutional element changes over time. The 
entropic assumption tells us that the active role of other elements to stop the decomposition 
process is required. I hope that my theory and findings encourage future inquiry into the dynamic 
nature of institutional elements. 
Moreover, this study contributes to the burgeoning literature on the enduring influence of 
regional institutional pressures acting as a lens for organizations to interpret their overall 
institutional environment. In particular, my results show that the influence of regional 
institutional contexts on organizational behavior may depend on the legitimacy of a federal 
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policy. Although I show how informal institutional contexts play a role in the commitment of 
plants to enhance their environmental performance, my additional analyses also illustrate that 
organizations are more likely to respond to formal sociopolitical pressures at the regional level 
when stakeholders lose confidence in the federal law. Similarly, political mediation theorists 
have explained why successful policies can often lead to the end of associated social movements 
as stakeholders and other audiences concentrate on legal compliance and perceive the enactment 
of these policies as the natural end of movement’s life cycle (Soule and Olzak, 2004; Olzak and 
Soule, 2009; Amenta et al., 2010). 
This insight is in line with the Ostromian view (Pennington, 2012; Ostrom, 2015) on the 
effectiveness of decentralized authority for determining rules for governing the use of resources. 
According to Ostrom (2015), a centralized federal regulatory environment decreases incentives 
for those involved at the local level to search for ways to improve local governance. My results 
also suggest that relevant stakeholders are more likely to pay attention to the implementation of 
federal law when the law serves as an overarching framework. In other words, the legitimacy of 
a federal regulation absorbs and mitigates local sociopolitical influences on organizations 
because local stakeholders depend on its validity. In the future, more empirical studies should be 
conducted to clarify whether my results hold in different legal contexts. 
Furthermore, this paper contributes to the non-market strategy literature (Hiatt and Park, 
2013; Carlos and Lewis, 2017; Durand and Georgallis, 2017; Hiatt, Carlos, and Sine, 2017). This 
vigorous new strand of research has examined a wide variety of actions that organizations deploy 
in order to manage their political environment and extract rents outside of the market itself 
(Bonardi, Holburn, and Bergh, 2006; Ring et al., 2005; Hillman, Keim, and Schuler, 2004; 
Hillman and Hitt, 1999). The repertoire of tactics deployed by organizations include constituency 
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building, coalition formation, lobbying, advocacy advertising, and so forth (Oliver and 
Holzinger, 2008; Bonardi, Holburn, and Bergh, 2006; Hillman and Keim, 1995). While 
providing valuable insights, this literature has yet to examine how the nuanced dynamic between 
societal and local-level institutional pressures may affect the effectiveness of firm strategic 
efforts. This omission is important for several reasons. First, a failure to understand the 
substitutive role between societal and local-level institutional pressures may lead organizations 
to target their strategies towards the wrong sociopolitical actors. For example, my theory and 
empirical results suggest that in the period that the ARP was challenged (2010–2011), 
organizations should have shifted their attention towards managing their relationship with local 
(state-level) actors. Had an organization continued to focus exclusively on managing federal 
actors (the appropriate strategy before 2009), it would have not only wasted its efforts but 
possibly failed to protect itself from hostile actions by local sociopolitical actors.  
Last, my theory and results have important implications for organizations operating in 
multiple local institutional environments. During the period when all stakeholders accepted the 
ARP as a legitimate mechanism to reduce SO2 emissions, these organizations could implement a 
generalist compliance strategy that appeased all parties. Once the ARP came under scrutiny, 
these organizations would need to devise and implement a strategy better tailored to the 
characteristics of the different locations where they operated. A one-size-fits-all non-market 
strategy was no longer appropriate under these conditions. Importantly, organizations operating 
in multiple locations will tend to be larger than those operating in a single location. The larger 
size of these organizations implies that they will also experience strong inertial forces. Therefore, 
these organizations will tend to be slower to shift (if at all) from a generalist to a niche non-
market strategy. Here, I call attention both to the need to adjust and to overcome the internal 
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inertial forces that will try to impede it. Future research could explore how organizations 
operating in multiple locations adjust their non-market strategy and whether and how their 
response differs from that of organizations operating in a single location. 
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